

The Month in Review

THE SOVIET-SATELLITE attempts to counteract the disruptive effects of the Soviet Twentieth Congress were stepped up in recent weeks and now include an outright repudiation of some of the key concepts propounded at the Congress. Stalin, so savagely denounced by Khrushchev and others little more than a year ago, is now once again venerated as one of the immortals of "Marxism." Stalin's paranoiac fears, which had been translated into pseudo-theoretical formulations such as the ever-worsening "class struggle" and the danger of "encirclement," now seem to have been tactically adopted by his successors, and with much the same effect. Though the propaganda drive for "coexistence" continues, the main emphasis has lately shifted to a concentrated denunciation of the West, particularly of the US, which is accused of plotting the destruction of the "Socialist" countries and the enslavement of the rest of the world. Lip service is still being paid to "equality" in relations among the Communist-ruled countries, but to the attack on "national Communism" has now been added the stern warning that so-called proletarian internationalism—that is, Moscow's supremacy—must prevail. Finally, the notion that, in some countries, the Communists could achieve power through parliamentary means by discarding some of the weapons of the classical "class struggle" has now been dropped, and a vociferous campaign has been mounted to show that nowhere, least of all in the People's Democracies, do conditions warrant a softening of so-called proletarian vigilance.

On the first anniversary of the Twentieth Congress in mid-February, the celebrations, with the notable exception of those in Poland, reflected this rejection of the real meaning of the Congress. Much was said about the dangers of "revisionism" and of "petit bourgeois" ideas, but only the Poles were bold enough to point out that the Congress had signaled the end of a hated era and the dawn of a brighter, freer future. The Yugoslavs, long silent under increasing attack by Soviet-Satellite leaders and now the butt of their open scorn, were indignant, particularly at the Albanians and Bulgarians, used by Moscow to spearhead the offensive against them. In the sharp debate that followed, neither side yielded ground—the Soviets insisting that if the Yugoslavs were true Marxists they would adhere to the current Soviet line, the Yugoslavs protesting that the new line was neither Marxist nor in conformity with agreements reached with the Soviet leaders in the previous year. It was apparent, however, that neither side wished to precipitate a complete break. There arose therefore an anomalous situation, unprecedented in Communist history, of continued collaboration between two Communist camps engaged in a crucial ideological contest. The tension was partly relieved with the reprinting by *Pravda* of a relatively conciliatory editorial first published in the Romanian Party paper, *Scinteia*. In subsequent days, the other regimes in the area took their cue from this editorial and toward the end of March the controversy seemed to have been temporarily shelved though still unresolved.

The progressive hardening of the Soviet line also had conspicuous repercussions in Poland, where Gomulka was attempting to evolve new tactics and new patterns of social organization in an effort to implement his "liberalizing" program. The pressures on the new régime to restrict the scope of these plans were twofold: external, in the form of a constant threat of Soviet military intervention (lately reasserted by the signing of an agreement between the USSR and East Germany permitting the former to station Soviet troops to the west of Poland), and internal, in the form of opposition by members of the Natolin (Stalinist) faction.



Precariously ruling a divided Party in an anti-Communist, Catholic country whose economy is in need of drastic repairs, Gomulka has been maneuvering cautiously to consolidate his power by, first of all, "regularizing" his relations with Moscow. He has thus "purified" the Party by excluding from its press organs editors who committed the Party in print to ideas and programs at variance with official Soviet policies; he has also incorporated into the newly-formed government Natolinists like Zenon Nowak who until recently had opposed him. But while Gomulka has thus outwardly conformed, he apparently has not abandoned the most important aspects of his program. A number of specific issues remained unclear, such as the exact roles to be assigned to workers' councils in factories, to farmers' circles in the countryside, to youth organizations, Parliamentary clubs, and the Church. The draft of the overall economic plan for the year clearly indicates, however, that the consumer will be favored as never before—provided production increases as scheduled, and outside help is forthcoming. At the moment, in view of the critical economic situation, Gomulka has found it necessary to stop payment of back wage claims on the State. But by the end of the year real wages are scheduled to rise by twenty percent over the 1955 level, and investment in housing and cultural facilities will be increased at the expense of industrial investments.

The spring session of the Polish Parliament, which opened at the end of February, discussed the formation of the new government, the merger of some ministries and, above all, the economic plans for the year. The debate was relatively restrained though, once again, dissension was openly expressed. By contrast, in recent meetings of the National Assemblies of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria, uniformity and conformity prevailed.

The theme of areawide unity was once again reiterated with great fanfare on the occasion of the political pilgrimage to Moscow by a delegation of Bulgarian Party and government leaders. The talks ended with the now mandatory platitudes about Soviet "help" in defeating the Hungarian "counterrevolutionaries," and other current cliches about world affairs. More important, however, was the economic accord signed between the two countries which, if fully implemented, could transform Bulgaria into a prime source of vegetables and fruits, dependent on the Soviet Union for its supply of grain.

The present attempt by the Soviet leaders to repair the cracks in the Communist structure, and the ever greater role of China in this task, was dramatized by the trips to Asia of Premiers Siroky, who left Czechoslovakia on March 8, and Cyrankiewicz, who took off from Warsaw a few days later. Czechoslovakia and Poland celebrated the Tenth Anniversary of their mutual friendship pact on March 10, each stressing that relations were never better and would be closer in the future.

Czechoslovakia, now more than ever a key factor in Soviet strategy, also came to the assistance of the embattled Kadar regime in Hungary. In that country, repression continued to be the official policy. In an attempt to cope with the after-effects of the Revolt, the government was reorganized and its membership reshuffled, and top Party organs were strengthened. The regime's intentions were perhaps inadvertently disclosed by theoretician Jozsef Revai who, in an article in the Party paper, fulminated not only against former Premier Nagy and his group but also against those who dared criticize the policies of his Stalinist predecessors, Rakosi and Gero.

The Kadar regime has not yet taken this position (and seemed to be irked by Revai's indiscretions), but its acts betoken a return to the situation as it existed before the start of the ferment. New workers' guards have been formed, the army has been purged and reorganized, the study of Russian has once again been decreed for youth, and recollectivization is underway. Concurrently, intellectuals are being persecuted, student centers are being raided and arrests and executions are still taking place. Towards the end of March, Kadar and other top Hungarian Communists left for Moscow, for further consultations with their Soviet masters.



The recent Czechoslovak delegation in Moscow. Right: President Zapotocky and Premier Novotny. Left: Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin. The visit resulted in, among other things, "the coordination of the economic plans of the two countries."

Picture from *Svet v Obrazech* (Prague), February 9, 1957.

October's Aftermath

The effects of Satellite unrest upon the economic integration of the Soviet bloc, and the resulting shift in policy.

THE OCTOBER revolutions in Hungary and Poland have had consequences far transcending the partial success of Polish nationalism and the failure of Hungary's uprising. Some of the wider effects of the upheavals were obvious at once, such as the devaluation of the Satellites as a military asset, the dramatizing of Soviet imperialism and the increased influence of China in Communist affairs. At least as important, if not as immediately evident, is the change of pace now occurring in the Communist economic drive.

Only a year ago the Soviet and Satellite regimes were announcing new Five Year Plans designed to raise industrial production at a rate faster than the economic growth of Western countries. This continued a policy begun by Stalin in 1928, and the ultimate goal was, in the words of Soviet leaders, to "overtake capitalism." In East Europe the Communist planners had already raised coal production (including brown coal and lignite) from 277 million

tons in 1948 to 407 million in 1955; steel production from 6 million tons in 1948 to over 13 million in 1955; and electricity consumption from 34 billion kwh in 1948 to 73 billion in 1955.* The new Five Year Plans set targets for 1960 at 567 million tons of coal, 21 million tons of steel and over 120 billion kwh of electricity. In Communist propaganda the rather startling expansion of production during the postwar years—mainly in heavy industry—was projected into the future as if it were merely a line on a chart, and led to some uncomfortable predictions in the Western press. Recent events indicate that the prospect was exaggerated.

One flaw in the planning was exposed by the demonstration in Poznan last June, when workers crowded the streets shouting for freedom and bread. The political events that followed grew in momentum until the Soviet armies in Hungary found themselves fighting against the very working class whose banner they presumed to carry. Evidences of unrest appeared all over East Europe and even in the USSR itself. It was clear that Communism had achieved its past successes at considerable cost, and that the vaunted targets of industrial production had depended on political loyalties that did not really exist. The new Five Year Plans had assumed that high-pressure industrialization at the expense of living standards was still a safe policy for a few more years, and that the more sensitive elements of public opinion—youth and the intellectuals—could be induced to side with the planners.

The high targets of the Five Year Plans are now being

* The totals include Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.

quietly reduced. The new targets have not yet been made public, but apparently the Soviet bloc has undergone a significant shift in economic policy. One estimate of the Russian situation suggests that the USSR now plans to produce about 550 million tons of coal in 1960 instead of the 593 originally proposed; 60 million tons of steel instead of 68 million; 275 billion kwh of electricity instead of 320 billion (*The New York Times*, February 17, 1957). Similar revisions are being made in the plans of Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Romania and Bulgaria, and have already been made in that of Poland. At the same time Hungary, once the scene of Europe's most frenzied industrialization, has become an economic vacuum.

The general slowdown is based on a number of political and economic considerations, involving a fundamental shift in Communist tactics. It is accompanied, except in Poland, by a tightening of ideological controls—especially over intellectuals and youth—emphasis on Satellite loyalty to the USSR, renewed hostility to Tito's Yugoslavia, warnings against Western imperialism and espionage, a more favorable estimate of Stalin's accomplishments than has recently been the rule, and, at the same time, a pronounced effort to improve living standards throughout the Soviet bloc. These policies have been associated in the past with the leadership of men like Molotov (in the political sphere) and Malenkov (in the economic sphere). Their resurrection at this time implies that the program outlined at the Twentieth Congress a year ago is now considered economically overambitious and politically dangerous.

Broken Plans

IN THE BLOC of still reliable Satellites—Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania—the new program has two important purposes. One is to prevent the sort of intellectual thaw that preceded the Hungarian and Polish upheavals, when outspoken criticism by Party members led to public demonstrations and mass revolt. The other purpose is to offer the masses a placebo of food and consumer goods. This double purpose is at once a confession that the East European Parties have little support among the people and that ten years of Communist planning have not improved the common lot.

When the emergency was plain, the changes came swiftly. Even before Russian troops had crushed Hungary into silence, President Zapotocky of Czechoslovakia was telling his nation: "We shall not allow anyone to threaten our Socialist system with demagogic slogans, demands or pretexts of any kind whatsoever." At the same time he promised that his Party would continue to work ceaselessly for the improvement of economic conditions.

"In the current year alone, we were able to provide 4.5 billion koruny for price reductions, adjustments of wages and improvements in national insurance. Our people can pursue their fruitful work without anxieties and worries over the future." (Radio Prague, November 3)

A similar line of toughness and conciliation was adopted elsewhere in the bloc. It was followed in November and December by a flurry of economic concessions. Czechoslo-



Top Polish delegation in Moscow last November. Upper photo, left: Khrushchev, Voroshilov, Bulganin and Mikoyan; right: Gomulka, Zawadzki, Cyrankiewicz. At bottom, the same Poles (from right to left), with the Polish economic planner Jedrychowski at far left. The Poles were able to extract major economic concessions from the Russians.

Pictures from *Przyjazn* (Warsaw), November 25, 1956.

vakia lowered its retail prices for the second time in a year. Romania raised wages, pensions and family allowances. Bulgaria granted higher pensions to collective farmers, raised wages and family allowances for other workers. Albania reduced prices and raised salaries and pensions (see January issue, pp. 45-50). The reforms were startling in number if not in magnitude, and raised a question as to where the tightly budgeted regimes would find the resources to implement them. The Bulgarian Central Council of Trade Unions estimated that the cost of all the standard of living reforms granted since last summer would run to 2.8 billion leva, a sum equal to more than two thirds of last year's industrial investment.*

Added to these budgetary drains were the problems created by the collapse of Hungary's economy and Poland's determination to seek more favorable terms for its export trade. The whole structure of the Satellite Plans had rested

* Radio Sofia, December 20. The estimate covered "various government measures, such as reduced food prices in workers' canteens, increased pensions, increased prices [to peasants] in connection with changes in State deliveries, pensions to collective farm workers, [higher] family allowances, and increased wages for all low-paid workers and employees whose basic monthly salary is less than 450 leva." The first three measures were announced in June and July (see August issue, p. 48).

on a tightly woven network of international trade. Gomulka's rise in Warsaw was followed very shortly by reduced exports of Polish coal to East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and the announcement that coal exports in 1957 would be cut by seven million tons, largely at the expense of the Soviet bloc. Kadar's government in Budapest was unable to assure an early resumption of the flow of Hungarian bauxite, machinery and foodstuffs to its partners.

The orbit's spokesmen soon began to admit, one by one, that sweeping revisions were under way. East Germany's Premier Otto Grotewohl said in mid-December that the "events in Hungary and Poland" would force his country to change its Five Year Plan (*The New York Times*, December 14). Romania's First Party Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej admitted, in a report to his Central Committee at the end of December, that the effort to improve living standards would force a substantial cut in funds going to industry.

"On the basis of preliminary calculations it appears that the implementation of all investments provided for by the directives of the Second Five Year Plan would demand efforts in the economy which would hinder implementation of the provisions for raising the workers' living standards. Therefore we propose that some provisions of the directives be re-examined so as to reduce State investments in the period 1956-1960. . . . The volume of investment must assure the continued development of Socialist industry, but at a slower pace corresponding to the real resources and possibilities of the economy. . . . We must guide our efforts toward the massive development of agricultural production, light and food industries and housing construction, to which the raising of the workers'

living standards is now directly linked." (*Scintea* [Bucharest], December 30)

Bulgaria announced a radical cut in planned investment for 1957, setting the target 34 percent below last year's investment plan (*Rabotnicheskoe Delo* [Sofia], December 28 and 30). Czechoslovakia was also revising its Plan, though official spokesmen were chary of details. President Zapotocky said on January 4 that "as a result of the recent international events, which have not been without effect on our economy, we shall also have to adjust and change our plan of economic development in some directions" (*Rude Pravo*, January 5). In Poland the Plan published last summer had been undergoing a long process of criticism and revision. Stefan Jedrychowski, Chairman of the Planning Commission, said in January that investment outlays in 1957 would probably be 47.5 billion *zloty* instead of the 53.4 billion *zloty* provided for in the original Five Year Plan. Funds for light industry, agriculture and the food industry were to be increased at the expense of heavy industry, particularly the machinery, oil and metallurgical industries. Coal production would drop by more than two million tons because of a reduction in miners' working hours (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], January 7). Finally Hungary, on January 6, announced the complete abandonment of its Five Year Plan.

The Web of Trade

THOUGH THEIR INTENTION was clear, the regimes were slow in spelling it out. At the end of February 1957 only Bulgaria had published its economic plan for the year.



Top-level Party and government delegation from Bulgaria leaving for Moscow. Premier Yugov is fourth from left; First Party Secretary Todor Zhivkov is third from right; former Premier Vulko Chervenkov is at extreme right. According to the official declaration at the end of the talks, the visit produced a number of economic concessions by the USSR to Bulgaria.

Picture from *Rabotnicheskoe Delo* (Sofia), February 16, 1957.

Lights burned late from Berlin to Moscow as authorities labored to remake the complex system of "balances" that are the context of Communist planning. Their headaches were multiplied by the intricate way in which national plans interlock among the countries of the Soviet bloc. Less coking coal from Poland would mean less steel for East Germany, and this in turn would allow fewer German machines for Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia's aluminum industry would feel the loss of bauxite from Hungary. Communist leaders had often boasted that the planned economies of the Soviet bloc insured the member countries against the ups and downs of the capitalist world. Now it appeared that Communist misfortunes might be just as contagious as capitalist depressions. The extent of this dependence can be gathered from a glance at the table on page 7.

The "Russification" of East Europe had destroyed the traditional economic ties of those countries with the West and bound them instead to the USSR. In 1955 about 60 percent of the trade of the USSR and its European Satellites was carried on among themselves. Roughly a third of Poland's trade was with the USSR, and a quarter of it with the other Satellites. The position of Czechoslovakia was similar. East Germany, Romania and Bulgaria were even more closely linked with the Soviet bloc: two thirds of East Germany's trade, three quarters of Romania's and four fifths of Bulgaria's was carried on with the USSR and its European Satellites. Hungary had the smallest concentration, but its proportion was still more than half.

The currents of this trade were governed by the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (KOMEKON), located in Moscow, through a complex system of long-term trade agreements. By 1956 a pattern of specialization had evolved reflecting the natural resources and industrial development of the member countries. In terms of exports it included the following.*

USSR: Industrial equipment of all sorts; iron ore; manganese; non-ferrous metals; textile raw materials.

Poland: Coal; coke; zinc; rolled metal; machinery; ships; textiles.

Czechoslovakia: Industrial equipment and machinery; farm machinery; road and rail vehicles; textiles; leather; glass products; ceramics.

East Germany: Electrotechnical equipment; optical instruments; precision goods; chemicals; fertilizers.

Hungary: Locomotives and diesel engines; electrotechnical products; machine tools; bauxite; foodstuffs.

Romania: Oil; timber; wheat; cement; locomotives; fishing vessels; equipment for the oil industry.

Bulgaria: Non-ferrous ores; cement; food products; tobacco.

Albania: Oil; bitumen; chrome ore; agricultural produce.

But in addition to this normal division of labor, the area was being pushed toward national specialization of a much more detailed sort. While in earlier years the economic planning of the various countries had sought to industrial-

ize each of them more or less independently, in recent years official sources have emphasized a shift toward industrial integration. The old policy was criticized as leading to unnecessary duplication of productive facilities in separate countries. The new purpose was a gradual unification of East Europe as a single economic unit tied to the Soviet Union. Modern mass production, it was said, required specialization and division of labor. For example, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania all produced tractors; in the future they were to specialize on different types of tractors, exporting some and importing others. Even the production of ball bearings was to be parcelled out among different countries by types.

The simplest way of achieving this goal would have been to apply one master Five Year Plan to the whole area. Instead, to preserve the appearance of national sovereignty, each country was to "coordinate" its planning with the others. This was carried out through the KOMEKON apparatus, in which the various national representatives presumably agreed on a common program. In the first half of 1956 all of the Satellites except Bulgaria announced Five Year Plans, running through 1960, which had been carefully integrated with each other and with the Soviet Plan. The new division of labor was particularly elaborate in the machinery and metallurgical industries. The degree to



President Zápotocký receives new Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, I. T. Grishin. In his speech the President stressed the value to Czechoslovakia of coordinating of two Five-Years Plans.

Picture and caption from *Czechoslovak Life* (Prague), April 1956.

* *Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin* (Prague), Sept. 1956, p. 4.

Soviet Bloc Trade in 1955

(Exports plus Imports)

	USSR	Poland	Hungary	Czechoslovakia	East Germany	Romania	Bulgaria
Value of World Trade (in billions of rubles)	24.8	7.4	4.6	8.9	9.9	3.9	1.6
Percent of Trade with:							
USSR	—	32.2	22.0	33.7	40.0	47.0	46.2
Poland	9.7	—	5.1	6.7	10.1	2.6	4.0
Hungary	4.0	3.1	—	5.6	5.1	5.1	4.3
Czechoslovakia	12.1	8.4	11.8	—	6.1	12.8	11.6
East Germany	16.1	13.4	10.0	6.7	—	7.7	13.1
Romania	7.3	1.3	3.3	4.5	3.0	—	4.6
Bulgaria	2.8	0.9	1.7	2.2	2.0	2.1	—
China, Albania, North Korea, Outer Mongolia	6.6	3.8	5.7	10.1	8.1	2.1	3.5

These figures were computed on the basis of scattered information published in official sources, and are not necessarily exact. A

description of the sources and methods used may be obtained in mimeographed form upon request. Italicized figures are estimates.

which integration had been carried was indicated by *Pravda* (Moscow), on July 27, 1956. The paper revealed that bloc-wide planning for the machine-building industries included "the level of production of the most important types of machinery . . . the volume of reciprocal deliveries of goods . . . specialization in the production of the most important types of machinery . . . and the basic trends of technical progress . . .".

"For example, equipment for the coal industry of the European people's democracies will be produced in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia . . . equipment for cement works chiefly in East Germany, refrigerator cars only in East Germany, equipment for the production of aluminum from bauxite only in Hungary. The production of equipment for the knitwear industry will be developed chiefly in East Germany, and for the leather and footwear industry in Czechoslovakia, etc."

Similar integration was under way in the iron and steel industries "both in the USSR and in the European people's democracies," in order to "increase the smelting of pig iron by 1960 to 68.3 million tons, the production of steel to 90.4 million tons and rolled stock to 68.6 million tons."

" . . . it is considered necessary to implement in the near future the specialization of rolling mills, and on this basis to expand the coordinated supplying of metal among the countries according to regular grades and to extend considerably the production of economical types of rolled metal."

Integrated planning was also applied, according to *Pravda*, to the production of copper, aluminum, nickel, coal, oil and gas, and chemicals.

It was into this clockwork that the bolt of revolution fell last October. The extent to which it can be repaired, and what shape "Socialist cooperation" may now take, are not yet clear. At the turn of the year there was a great coming

and going of delegations among the capitals of East Europe, and all of the Satellites sent missions to Moscow.

The Cost of Empire

MUCH OF THE IMMEDIATE burden of reorganizing and stabilizing Eastern Europe's economy will have to be carried by the USSR. Since Poznan the Soviets have granted economic assistance in some form to all of the Satellites except Albania. The total value of this aid can only be estimated, but it is large in proportion to past commitments and in proportion to Soviet trade with the Satellites. It is certainly more than six billion rubles and may be as great as eight billion.

The most successful petitioner has been Poland. Gomulka's delegation to Moscow in November achieved, among other things, a cancellation of obligations on past loans amounting to more than 2.1 billion rubles. It also got a loan of grain valued at 400 million rubles and a trade credit of 700 million rubles. While the credits are repayable at various times between 1957 and 1965, the debt cancellation represents a net expenditure for the USSR.

Another big concession went to East Germany in an agreement of last July. This cut in half the German contribution to the maintenance of Soviet troops stationed there, and represents an additional charge to the USSR of about 1.44 billion rubles annually. The agreement also extended credit in goods and hard currency to an unspecified amount (estimated by some sources at more than two billion rubles). Another agreement was announced in January, when a delegation from East Germany visited Moscow and obtained a loan of 340 million rubles, repayable in 1959.

Early in October, before the Hungarian revolt, the Sov-

jects granted Hungary a loan of 100 million rubles in goods (coke, rolled metals, nonferrous metals, synthetic rubber, etc.) and Western currencies, repayable in 1960-1965. Since October formal Soviet aid is reported to have totalled 288 million rubles: gifts of goods valued at 38 million rubles and long-term credit in convertible currency equaling 250 million rubles. Recently negotiations were reported under way to extend this credit to a billion rubles.

Romania obtained, on December 1, a long-term credit of 270 million rubles and an agreement to postpone for three years the payments due on past obligations. Also included was a loan of wheat (450,000 tons) and fodder (60,000 tons) to tide Romania over its poor harvest in 1956.

Bulgaria also received a wheat loan of 50,000 tons on October 31. On February 20 another agreement gave Bulgaria a credit of 200 million rubles for the construction of fertilizer, lead and zinc factories.

Cost in 1957

The cancellation of Polish obligations and the reduction of charges on East Germany amount to the removal of what may best be described as imperial levies. The other concessions may more properly be called "economic assistance." All of them, however, will have the same effect in the immediate future—i.e., a reduction of Soviet imports from the Satellites (because of the cancellation or postponement of Satellite obligations to the USSR) and an increase in Soviet exports (from trade credits, commodity loans and the greater cost of maintaining troops in East Germany). A maximum estimate of the drain on the So-

viet economy in 1957 alone would seem to lie between three and four billion rubles—not including the further assistance that is likely for Hungary. This amounts to 15 or 20 percent of total Soviet trade with the Satellites in 1955.

Such an outgo, although large in comparison with past concessions, and impressive when compared with the USSR's exploitation of the Satellites in earlier years, is not large enough to have a serious effect on the mammoth Soviet economy. Capital investments, after all, are scheduled at 175 billion rubles in 1957. The most telling effect is likely to be on Soviet supplies of certain industrial raw materials, especially coal. While the USSR is the world's second largest coal producer (391 million tons in 1955), some of its production is of inferior quality, and in 1955 it imported 8.2 million tons of high grade coal from Poland. In 1957 Poland will export less coal to the Soviet bloc. The Satellite troubles have already required Russian shipments of coal and coke to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany (*Szabad Nep* [Budapest], September 25; Radio Budapest, December 22; Radio Warsaw, January 8; *Rude Pravo*, March 3).

The total burden to the Soviets will be partially offset by other factors. The bumper wheat crop of 1956, marking the initial success of Khrushchev's virgin land policy, has facilitated the wheat loans to Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. The hard currency credits to East Germany and Hungary are being counterbalanced by gold exports.* And

* Soviet gold exports were estimated by London brokers at 4.3 million ounces in 1956, the largest amount in any year since the war (*The New York Times*, February 27, 1957).

A TWO-WAY RAIL LINK WITH USSR

PHOTOS BY KAREL VENDLER

OUR most important railway line is that which runs eastward from Prague by way of Žilina and Košice to Čierná, the only direct railway junction between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Beyond the Czechoslovak-Soviet frontier the line continues by way of Lwow and Kiev to Moscow. This line is therefore a vital trade route between the two countries, along which flow Soviet raw materials



Picture and caption from *Czechoslovak Life* (Prague), Feb. 1956.

Areawide Economic Integration

The following account, from a Radio Moscow broadcast of May 14th, 1956, is one of the most detailed reports available on the structure of East European economic integration. It does not, however, show the full extent of joint planning in the vital engineering industries, nor the area's dependence on Polish coal and Soviet iron ore and ferrous metals.

"FOR THE construction of Socialism in the European People's Democracies, close and mutually advantageous economic relations among the countries of the world's Socialist system are of the greatest importance. . . . Coordination of national economic plans, specialization and cooperation in production, scientific and technical cooperation, and other forms of economic rapprochement have markedly developed between the People's Democracies and the USSR.

"Of particular importance for the economy of the Socialist countries is the coordination of their national economic plans. This by no means implies that a single plan is being evolved for the entire Socialist camp. Each country compiles its own plan, but representatives of planning and other economic organs consult each other. On the basis of coordinated plans . . . cooperation and specialization in various branches of the national economy [are introduced].

"An example of such cooperation is the agreement concluded between Hungary and Czechoslovakia with respect to the development of the aluminum industry. The agreement aims at helping Czechoslovakia build an aluminum factory working on Hungarian bauxite, and at helping Hungary, by means of delivery of Czechoslovak equipment, to construct factories for bauxite processing.

"Agreements between Czechoslovakia and Hungary and between Poland and Hungary on distribution of the production of certain types of rolled metal among the factories of these countries promote better use of rolled metal equipment. In the field of power production, agreements have been concluded on the merger of power networks and the mutual transmission of power between Romania and Hungary, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria and Romania. The European People's Democracies are presently engaged in solving the problem of joint exploitation of the water power of rivers as big as the Danube. . . .

"The Romanian-Hungarian economic cooperation agreement envisages joint construction of a big gas-chemical combine in Romania based on local natural gas. Hungary will deliver machinery for the combine as well as equipment for the Romanian soda industry. Romania, in turn, will insure the transmission of natural gas to the chemical enterprise being built in Hungary.

"It must be kept in mind that the enterprises constructed by the joint efforts of the Socialist countries are not mixed enterprises or joint-stock firms. The matter in question is the construction of national enterprises with the cooperation of friendly countries which are paid for the aid they give. . . . Thus Poland, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia are building enterprises in Romania for

the production of cellulose, utilizing local reeds. The GDR, Czechoslovakia and Poland will provide equipment for the construction of this plant, and the cost of equipment and other expenditures will be paid by Romania by deliveries of cellulose for several years.

"In the matter of the development of the national economies of the People's Democracies, cooperation of these countries with the Soviet Union is of first-rate importance. The USSR occupies first place in the foreign trade turnover of the European People's Democracies, renders them financial and technical aid, and delivers equipment. The strengthening of economic cooperation . . . is accompanied by extensive exchanges of scientific and technical information, mutual exchanges of patents and licenses for various inventions and even participation in the planning and construction of enterprises. . . . The leading role in this respect belongs to the Soviet Union. . . . It suffices to note, for example, the fact that the Soviet Union helped Poland build 66 industrial projects. Delivery of complex equipment for enterprises and assistance in their construction assume increasing importance and are practiced by individual European People's Democracies.

"Czechoslovakia delivers complex equipment for industrial enterprises to Hungary, equipment for large power stations to Romania, equipment for power stations and light and food industry factories to Bulgaria. In the last five years the Soviet Union turned over to the People's Democracies over 450 plans for capital construction, over 1,100 blueprints of complex machinery, and some 700 technological processes for manufacturing. . . . The Soviet Union received in the same period about 30 plans for capital construction, some 500 blueprints of complex machinery and equipment, and over 550 technological processes from the People's Democracies. . . . Recently Poland passed on to Czechoslovakia specifications for a number of important industrial projects in the coal, metallurgical, chemical and other industries. Over 180 Czechoslovak experts took a practical course at Polish enterprises. Czechoslovakia in her turn passed on to Poland technical specifications for mining machinery and equipment. Over 170 Polish experts were trained in practical work at Czechoslovak enterprises. . . . Romania is passing on to Bulgaria specifications for the oil and cellulose industries, building technology and the health service. . . .

"The coordination of national economic plans, specialization and cooperation of production, scientific and technical cooperation and the exchange of experts—all these forms of economic cooperation are a product of the new international relations existing among the countries of the world system of Socialism. . . ."

At Borș, on the Rumanian-Hungarian frontier. Oxygen tubes, filled at Oradea, on their way to the railway-wagon works of Debrecen



Relief shipments to Hungary.

Important quantities of firewood and petrol were sent from Rumania to the fraternal Hungarian people



Rumania Today (Bucharest), December 1956

the new break with Tito has made it possible to renege on promises to extend assistance to Yugoslavia valued at about a billion rubles (*The New York Times*, February 27).

The Reappraisal

THE GENERAL program set forth a year ago at the famous Twentieth Congress of the CPSU—and faithfully echoed in other countries—was based on an overoptimistic appraisal of Communism's viability. The policy of de-

Stalinization assumed that a limited amount of intellectual freedom might be safely allowed, at least to the rank and file of Party members. The economic policy assumed that the high postwar rate of capital accumulation might be extended at least until 1960. The debacle of last fall has apparently forced a major reappraisal of Communist political and economic prospects. The new program recognizes that the Communists have not won their populations, that East Europe must still be secured by the unabashed use of force, and that the planners can no longer neglect the elementary wants of human beings.

Burning Choice

A ROMANIAN COMMUNIST died and went to hell. When he got there, he was confronted with two doors. On one door was the notice "Communist Hell," and on the other "Capitalist Hell."

"Which of the two do you choose?" he was asked.

"The Communist hell, of course," he replied, "there is bound to be a fuel shortage."

New Look

in Fashions

A Review of Post-Stalinist Attitudes toward Style, Good Taste and Diversity in Dress

IN THE PAST year a new line in fashion has emerged in the Soviet bloc. This revival of fashion-consciousness began in 1953; as an aspect of the New Course it reflected the new emphasis on consumer goods and the increased regard for amenities as a reaction against the austerity of Stalinism. Then came the Geneva Conference of July 1955, and the policy of "coexistence" and exchange directly spurred fashion, as Western techniques and ideas gradually filtered into the bloc.

In the early days of Communist domination in Eastern Europe, hardship and regimentation themselves constituted "the fashion." In cities like Budapest, Bucharest, Prague, Sofia and Warsaw, where women before the war had enjoyed a reputation for stylishness, a pervasive shabbiness and monotony of dress set in. The shortage of consumer goods, particularly textiles, precluded any variety or refinement in dress: clothes were rationed in all the countries of the Soviet bloc (until as recently as December 1955 in Romania). Women had neither the time nor the means to cultivate the art of dress: their days were wholly consumed with the demands of full-time factory and farm jobs, organization meetings, and arduous housekeeping.

Up to 1953 the fashions shown in women's magazines were faithful images of the somber cast of Stalinist life. Clothes were starkly simple, stressed the purely functional aspect of dress, showed no variety or detail. There were no pleated skirts, ruffled blouses, cocktail or evening dresses, or any lingerie. The magazines almost never showed illustrations of costume jewelry or accessories such as handbags and umbrellas. Readers were regularly reminded that similarity in style of dress is not lack of taste, because under the conditions of a "Socialist" society, clothes are not a sign of class distinction. In fact, there developed a dis-



BUCHAREST INTERNATIONAL FASHION SHOW

1957
Models

Romanian fashion show.

Rumania Today (Bucharest), December 1957

tinct taboo against "stylishness": fashion was associated with capitalist decadence, and conspicuous dress invited suspicion. A Polish writer, Anna Bukowska, has described this in an article in *Poland* (Warsaw), No. 10/14, 1955, which reviewed the attitude toward dress in Poland before and after the thaw. The author said that material difficulties prompted an attitude, especially among the youth, which exercised a great influence in matters of dress. "Simplicity and moderation, suggestive of nonchalance," became



Bulgarian store selling women's clothes.

Narodna Kooperatzia (Sofia), August 1955

the accepted mode. "We are struggling, we are building, we have no time to think of clothes" was implied by the advocates of this style, said the author. She added: "I was then at the university and I recall that the question of fashion simply did not exist for us—there were so many larger and weightier problems. It even went so far that dressing fashionably was considered a betrayal of our ideals, of the 'new man.'" The author described how, when on one occasion she appeared in a Paris coat, her friends were embarrassed to be seen with her. The coat was put away and she wore an old jacket in which she felt "in style." Anna Bukowska's article concluded:

"As life became more normal . . . the desire was stimulated for pretty, original clothes, which, unfortunately, the clothing industry was not at first able to satisfy. Both the fabrics as well as the styles were simply ugly and monotonous, so that one had to resort to one's own inventiveness and ideas. The result was to provide an incentive for the clothing industry, which began to follow the fashions with ever greater interest. . . . [Now] everything points to the fact that the period of hardships has passed in fashion and will not return. The first steps have already been taken. . . ."

Popular interest in dress has grown rapidly in the past four years and the regimes now encourage this in line with their current aims. As contact with the outside world has increased, the Communists have become more conscious of appearances on their own grounds. In the December 13, 1953, issue of *Rude Pravo* (Prague) a high regime official attacked the proponents of "Sucharism" (drabness) for holding that under "Socialism" there could be no beauty or variety in clothes, furnishings, etc. By talk of raising the level of dress the regimes can create the impression of a more abundant life, a greater flow of consumer goods, all testifying to regime concern with the people's well-being. Furthermore, in the Soviet bloc press for foreign circulation, displays of handsome clothes not only contribute to a "dressed-up" picture of conditions in the Soviet bloc but are good propaganda for the ready-made clothes industry

which is now more than ever seeking Western markets.

In fact, as the published State economic plans and the statements in the Polish press about the real standard of living under the Communist economy both plainly reveal, there can be little or no improvement in the clothes situation for the average consumer; good clothes are still reserved for the economically privileged. The "new line" in fashion is primarily a change in attitude, with more emphasis on care and taste in dress.

Fabrics

THE MAIN material basis for the new emphasis on dress is the larger supply of fabric for clothes. After years of shortage, there is allegedly a greatly increased selection of both domestic and imported fabrics, including synthetics; although their quality is often criticized. In the case of synthetics, many technical problems have not been overcome. *Otechestven Front* (Sofia), October 21, 1955, commented on the rayon which was introduced in Bulgaria in 1953-54. The paper said that, although it was "welcomed by women for its beauty and low price," the Bulgarian rayon has two serious defects: it wrinkles very easily and stretches badly. *Technicheskoe Delo* (Sofia), August 7, 1956, wrote that the manufacture of nylon stockings is new in Bulgaria and their quality is "not always the best." This was attributed to the fact that "the specific properties of the nylon yarn are not altogether known, as well as the conditions which have to be observed in working it."

Czechoslovakia, the major textile-manufacturing country of the Soviet bloc, has produced a number of variations of rayon and nylon under the names of perlon, tricotine (similar to nylon tricot), and the newest, silon, which is used mainly for lingerie and stockings. Stocking production had increased 40 percent in a year, according to *Lidova Demokracie* (Prague), July 8, 1955. The same newspaper's November 15, 1955 issue praised a new fabric called "slov-color," a shiny artificial taffeta in pastel colors. *Prace*

(Prague), September 18, 1956, mentioned a new light fabric called monofil which will be used for evening dresses.

Throughout the area the cheapest and most abundant fabric is cotton; wool is still at a premium. In Bulgaria a campaign has been under way to induce the peasants to adopt quilted cotton winter clothes instead of wool, which the regime wishes to export. *Izvestia* of the Economic Institute of the Bulgarian Academy of Science complained in 1953 that "hundreds of thousands of peasants are still wearing woolen clothes regardless of the season. . . . The quilted cotton winter clothes are an innovation introduced [by Communist industry]. If they could find greater acceptance, we could save for our national economy . . . approximately 1-2 million kilograms of wool a year."

Vecherni Noviny (Sofia), April 2, 1956, reported an exhibition of new spring woolen and silk cloth, at which over 200 fabrics for men's and women's clothing were displayed.

According to women's magazines throughout the orbit, luxury fabrics such as brocade, satin, taffeta and velvet are again available. Much of this is imported—silk from China, velvet from Poland and East Germany. In Hungary knits such as jersey were reported to be a popular new dress material (*Magyar Nemzet*, August 18, 1956).

Variety and Style

THE FIRST step in promoting fashion is to put an end to the complete uniformity in women's dress. Advertisement of the variety of styles for different occasions has

markedly increased. Clothes for the beach, for sports, for balls, even for shipboard parties, are again featured in the pages of women's magazines. Beaded and embroidered cocktail and evening dresses have returned. The October 2, 1956 issue of *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest) noted approvingly that "there are no longer hundreds of copies of one dress" in women's department stores. The Debrecen clothing factories, said the paper, makes not more than 300 copies of each model, which means that each store gets just a few. "Thus the uniformity which was so characteristic of the recent past has come to an end," the paper declared.


As part of the new "clothes-mindedness," women's periodicals publish regular columns giving wardrobe and fashion advice, including instructions on how to dress correctly for particular occasions—a refinement which atrophied during the years when there was no question of choice and discrimination in such details. *Zhenata Denes* (Sofia), July 1956, wrote revealingly: "If we can afford two pair of shoes—sports and high-heeled—we should remember that whether old or new the sports shoes should be worn with sports clothes and the dressy shoes with afternoon dresses for theater or parties. . . ." Possession of two different kinds of shoes ("whether old or new") is by no means taken for granted.

In Prague, Warsaw and Bucharest, there is a conspicuous return to more formal dress. No longer do people appear in theaters and night clubs in shirtsleeves and overalls, an accepted practice not long ago. Writing of the re-opening of a first class resort hotel (the Hotel Cristal in Zeleny



Coats are described as follows (left to right): "A paletto of black broadtail with fancy ermine trimming for evening wear"; "a smart all-occasions inexpensive seal rabbit coat"; "a loose let-out musquash coat."

Czechoslovak Life (Prague), January 1954



From left to right, Romanian, Bulgarian and Hungarian styles at the Bucharest 1957 Fashion Show.

Rumania Today (Bucharest), December 1957

Brod), *Svobodne Slovo* (Prague), May 30, 1956, announced that the management is prepared to maintain the international standards of the hotel in all respects: not only in service and cuisine but also in "the appearance of the guests." The paper warned that no one will be admitted to the hotel in the evening in sweaters or polo shirts; jackets and ties will be required.

In Czechoslovakia the rules for proper dress at the factory, trade union and mass organization balls were spelled out (*Svobodne Slovo*, January 25, 1956) :

"When we refer to a ball we think of a social event in a clean, nicely decorated hall, with well-dressed participants. Unfortunately, at many balls in our cities and villages, there appear dancers in knickers, sweat shirts and open-collared shirts, and women in sweaters and polo shirts. To say the least, this is not in taste. Let us not forget that dances are a part of the social education of youth. . . . Our living standard is such that everyone is able to have a dark suit. . . ."

The magazine *Hungary* (Budapest), for foreign readers, reporting on a showing of a collection of new spring and summer clothes for 1956, said: "All working women can afford to order one or two good dresses or a coat. Hungarian women are striving not only to look well when going out in the evening. They wear well-cut clothes and dress with taste and discernment on workdays as well. To be well-dressed in our country is no longer the privilege of a handful of idle rich . . . but the right of every working woman."



Styles of first Bulgarian Fashion Show held in Moscow, July 7-21, 1956.

Zhenata Denes (Sofia), October 1956

Skirts or Pants

A controversial issue in the Soviet bloc "fashion world" is the subject of women's slacks. Wearing slacks is partly inspired by Western fashion. But women in Eastern Europe first adopted slacks when, under Communism, they were drawn into heavy work in industry and agriculture. In the villages the girl tractor-operator resorted to slacks for purely practical reasons. This was considered genuinely "revolutionary," for previously it would have been unthinkable for a village woman to appear either at her place of work or any other place in slacks. The practice spread to the cities as women went to work as streetcar conductors, railway workers, etc.

Now, even though many women wear slacks, the custom has not yet found complete acceptance. The February 3, 1955 issue of *Nok Lapja* (Budapest) discussed the problem under the title "Skirts or Pants":

"The question is: should women wear pants or stick to skirts? There are many who are for pants and others who violently oppose the custom. The male workers of one of the County Councils belong to the latter category. They have all signed a memorandum—protesting pants. Group leaders should tactfully approach the subject, speak to the women sternly and explain to them that this practice will make them appear ridiculous in the eyes of the working peasants."

But the author defended the wearing of pants: "I personally believe that even the farmers have changed their attitude. The girl or woman who walks around in the dust and mud, or who rides on a bicycle bringing help and advice to the small farms, is just as respectable in pants as in skirts. Pants are in order especially in winter, as protection against the cold. Whether pants should be worn in the summer is a matter of fashion and taste. One thing is certain: it would be ridiculous and in bad taste to wear pants in the evening, in theaters and other places of entertainment."

Design

AN EFFECT of the increased international contact of the past two years which can be traced in the Soviet bloc press is the revived influence of Paris and New York on dress styles. A recent report from Poland said that women and young girls wait eagerly for French films in order to see the latest French clothes: the day after a new film has opened, new details can be noticed in the dresses on the street.

The regimes maintain a guarded attitude toward Western fashions; but French and American designs are displayed in fashion shows and magazines, even when only to be condemned. *Svobodne Slovo* (Prague), April 4, 1956, said that at (Czechoslovak) fashion shows, there are many dresses which are obviously inspired by Western fashion magazines and about which "women rightly demand: who is going to wear *that*, and where?" The paper warned: "Our women want to attend concerts and plays in good, elegant, original, but certainly not eccentric, dress. Czechoslovak fashion has selected a good line and should not stray



Above, "What We Should Not Wear"; below, "One Should Dress According to One's Age."

Zhenata Denes (Sofia), July 1956

from it. From international fashion [we] should adopt only that which is in keeping with the spirit and manner of our life. . . ."

The Polish *Swiat*, November 20, 1955, carried pictures of two French styles, a "middy" dress and a "harem" skirt, with the following comments:

"This [the first] is the most extreme line of today's silhouette. Such models are not in any case for daily wear—they are to show with a certain exaggeration the most characteristic features of the new season. Such clothes could be worn on the stage if there is a great lady of fashion in the play. They won't be worn even by an ordinary smart Parisian woman, although this model is taken from a Paris fashion magazine.

". . . [The second] model is a dress for dancing. The fashionable Oriental influence is stressed here. Of course

East and West



These photos illustrate the dual influence on East European fashion. Until recently Russian fashion set the style; now Western fashion is increasingly popular. Left, model from Moscow Fashion House displayed in *Przegiacolka* (Warsaw), December 6, 1953; Right, Paris styles from a French magazine pictured in *Femeia* (Bucharest), May 1956.

this model is not suitable for copying in our circumstances—nor with a grain of common sense in any circumstances whatsoever."

The Communists frown on the antic rivalry of dress designers in the free world. *Trud* (Sofia), September 21, 1956, wrote: "Two of the greatest dictators of the Paris couture want to impose for the new season two entirely different silhouettes: one with narrow shoulders and a tight skirt; the other, more feminine, with rounded hips and a flaring skirt. Which one will succeed? . . . For us, it is more interesting to know what the smart Paris working woman is wearing."

The political interpretation of matters of taste so characteristic of Stalinist "totality"—in this case, the linking of an affinity for "Western" (i.e., extreme or eccentric) clothes with reactionary political leanings—can still be found, most prominently in Bulgaria which, of the Soviet bloc nations with the partial exception of Albania, is politically and culturally closest to the Soviet Union and the least advanced in fashion. In a long article titled "How We Should Interpret Fashions," *Mladezh* (Sofia), January 1956, cautioned young people against preoccupation with dress and particularly with Western-capitalist fashions. The author condemned Western sartorial "extravagance, novelty and vanity," singling out low-necked dresses for their "bad biological effect on boys." According to this writer, "the new in capitalist fashion comes increasingly to express biological intentions and desires. All this is tied in with

the decadent taste in art and culture of bourgeois society." The author concluded—an echo from the Stalinist past—that "the blind imitation of Western styles is directly related to the ideas of the people who wear them."

National Motifs

Throughout Eastern Europe the trend in fashion has swung away from the East and toward the West. The Satellite fashion industry is trying to find a "line" between the cumbersome Russian styles which they no longer even pretend to like, and Western fashion which they consider often extreme and which, to the dogmatists, still carries an overtone of "Western imperialism." The large clothing establishments and the State Institutes of Industrial Design have designers' collectives which evolve the basic designs for the industry. Recently, national costumes have become a major influence in Satellite fashion: the highly colored and decorated costumes worn by the dancing, singing and other folk groups are used as the source for new and adapted designs and styles. Embroidered blouses and skirts are popular. The simple crocheted shawls which have been traditionally worn in the rural districts, especially by elderly women, have been promoted as a fashion, made in bright colors and worn with sophisticated afternoon dresses.

The Bulgarian *Otechestven Front*, September 21, 1956, declared that "our fashion has proved itself able to create its own styles and to make its contribution . . . by the skill-

ful use of many valuable national elements established in the course of centuries in the national women's costumes." On April 27, 1956 an account in the same newspaper of a fashion show exhibiting 120 different patterns for summer clothes said that "while at the other fashion shows in Bulgaria many of the designs were taken from foreign fashion magazines," at this show the patterns were inspired by "our rich national costumes modified by our designers to create [the basis for] a national fashion which would be in accordance with the taste and requirements of the masses."

Fashion shows put on by the dress industry, the local councils and local State stores are allegedly a great popular attraction and are given wide publicity in the press. "Fashion shows spread taste, acquaint customers with what is being produced, and are an accompaniment of a rising

living standard," said *Svobodne Slovo* (Prague), April 4, 1956. One of the "Socialist" features of these fashion shows is that, in theory, they provide the occasion for consumers to communicate directly to the producers their opinions and needs—in contrast to the capitalist fashion industry which "imposes" its products on a helpless public. In Prague, a new 8-story "House of Fashion" (modelled on the Moscow store of the same name) opened in July 1956 to serve as a showcase and sounding-board for advance styles before they appear in the regular State stores.

The first intra-bloc fashion contest was held in Prague in September 1953. It was attended by the Czechoslovak President and Premier accompanied by the entire diplomatic corps. (On this occasion Radio Prague said: "The competing nations are not going to close their doors to

Fashions 1957

Over eight thousand designs are to be used by the Czechoslovak clothing industry in 1957. In addition to improved quality many new shades are to be introduced. Some of the latest Centrotex models for export are shown here.



Wider coats return in tweed, fleece and mohair, in asymmetric cuts with large buttons.



An afternoon dress (left) of dark blue silk with white spots has jacket of same material. Hat is silver straw. The white cashmere dress (right) is worn with light blue fleece coat.

Czechoslovak Life (Prague), January 1957



Polish 1956 Fashions

Kulturprobleme des Neuen Polen (East Berlin), August 1956

each other; there will be none of the fashion spying we hear so much about in Paris and abroad.") Since then the Soviet bloc has held fashion contests annually, in 1955 in Berlin (Czechoslovakia was the winner; the Soviet Union and Bulgaria "abstained" and were represented only by observers) and in Warsaw last year. At a meeting in Prague in November, representatives of the clothing industries of the USSR, Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia decided to name the institution of intra-bloc fashion shows "The International Fashion Congress." The eighth International Fashion Congress will take place in June 1957, probably in the Soviet Union (*Lidova Demokracie* [Prague], November 4, 1956). Satellite fashions are also exhibited now at Trade Fairs outside the bloc, in Western Europe and the Middle East.

Practical Realities

THE FASHION shows, the well-filled shop windows, and the enthusiastic press, create a picture of new abundance which, however, is largely a mirage. Figures belie regime claims that good dress is now easily and widely available to all. In fact, Communist officials and their wives, actresses, Stakhanovites—the new elite—are the only group able to afford ample wardrobes. (Most of these, it is reported, buy imported clothes, through special shops such as "Romarta" in Bucharest or other such channels.) Furs, jewelry, leather handbags and similar finery are out of the reach of all but this small segment of the population. In Poland, for instance, it is estimated that a complete outfit consisting of a coat, suit, blouse, hat, shoes, stockings, and underclothing costs close to 6000 *zloty*. Stakhanovites, actresses, etc., may earn as much as 5000-6000 *zloty* a month. But the average wage for women in Poland is 800 *zloty* a month. The average working woman would have

to save for two or three years to buy such an outfit.

According to *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), August 18, 1956, a simple wool dress cost 400-500 *forint*—equivalent then to more than half a month's wages in Hungary (average industrial income: 900 *forint*). A ready-to-wear suit in Bulgaria costs 280-759 *leva* (average industrial monthly income: 500 *leva*). In Romania as of March 1956, a wool dress cost 1200 *lei*, a light coat 600 *lei*, nylon stockings 40-120 *lei* (imported nylons were 160-350 *lei*). The average wage for a woman worker is 300-500 *lei* a month. Only in Czechoslovakia is there a proportionate price scale: here, where the average monthly wage is 1300 *koruny*, a topcoat ranges in price from 490-1100 *koruny*, a taffeta cocktail dress is 160 *koruny*, everyday dresses are 140-250 *koruny* (*Vlasta* [Prague], August 30, 1956).

New Wrinkles

Apart from the almost prohibitive expense, women have resisted the new manufactured clothes for other reasons. Because of the forced pace of the development of the industry, there are many irregularities and defects in its products. Irate victims complain in the Satellite press that garments are shapeless, sleeves differ in length, colors run, seams open easily, etc. *Otechestven Front* (Sofia), January 12, 1955, observed that in spite of the "obvious advantages" of ready-made clothes, there are still people "who do not like ready-made clothes and do not buy them." The paper attributed this to monotonous and somber designs and shoddy material. Further, up to that time ready-to-wear clothes were being made only in one size—"medium." The journal *Narodna Kooperatsia* (Sofia), No. 11, 1956, published a long article criticizing the effects of prolonged and faulty warehouse storage of clothes: fading, permanent wrinkling, etc.

There have also been difficulties in merchandise control and distribution. Models and samples shown in fashion shows and magazines often could not be found in the State retail stores, and it was impossible to order from illustrations or dress patterns. In December 1955, a fashion writer in *Swiat* (Warsaw) expressed the "New Year's wish" for her readers that ordering a dress in a State shop would cease to be "a game of chance."

Private Initiative

Before Communist industrialization, East European women traditionally made their own clothes or had them made by seamstresses; and many—not only of the old and new bourgeoisie, but working women as well—still prefer to do so. Until recently, it was necessary to rely on magazines and dress patterns from abroad, and imported ma-

(Continued on page 22)



This photo, from *Swiat* (Warsaw), September 2, 1956, shows two women vendors in the Polish capital. The Poles have published a number of such candid pictures showing real conditions in the Soviet orbit. The lack of such photos from the other countries is a function of censorship, not necessarily of a higher standard of living. Throughout the area, the majority of the people are primarily concerned with preserving as long as possible the one, generally old and worn outfit they possess. Unlike their Russian counterparts, women of Eastern Europe know how to be fashionable and make heroic attempts to look well; few of them however have the means to follow the latest fashion trends.

Poland's Cosmetic Industry

I. Unofficial Version

THE COSMETICS industry in Poland, described by a recently escaped druggist, provides a good illustration of the chaos in regime economic operations. The key or basic part of the industry is State-owned and managed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry. Smaller enterprises in the provinces are still in private hands in the form of cooperatives and cottage industries, of which the most important are the cooperative in Bytom, "Hydrochemia" in Warsaw, "Floryna" in Cracow, and "Floryna" in Szczecin. Various enterprises in the fats industry also form part of the cosmetics industry.

The industry manufactures an assortment of 1,300 cosmetic items. The quality of these products is very low, both because of the inferior raw materials and the fraudulent manufacturing methods of the makers whose only concern is to fulfill their production plans: in order to meet quantity targets, quality is progressively lowered. For instance, a new kind of perfume called "Warszawianka" first appeared on the market with a high content of floral scent, which was thereafter reduced to a much lower percentage. The same practice was applied to Polish soap manufacture. Polish soap contains low-grade fats, and extracts imported mainly from Bulgaria. The price ranges from 1.05 to 2.25

Because of the glycerine shortage skin creams are made on a vaseline base and spoil rapidly. Even if certain items fail to sell because of poor quality or other reasons, their production continues; the plan must be fulfilled. Managers in the private sector of the industry bribe officials in the relevant State Ministry not to reduce their production quota allowances. As a result, a store which has thousands of jars of cream piled up nevertheless continues to receive new supplies. That is why when prices were reduced in 1954 and 1955, cosmetics were among the main items affected: the object was to get rid of the backlog. In 1954, at a meeting of store managers in Warsaw, one manager reported that he still had 20,000 jars of creams in stock. There was a general scramble for the creams, but it was discovered that they were rancid. At first there was an attempt to sell them at reduced prices, then they were returned to the factories to be re-processed.

When off-color lipsticks appeared in the stores and women refused to buy them, their prices were slashed. Soon afterwards a few thrift-minded women were seen in the streets wearing lipstick of various strange hues, which provoked jokes and laughter. The lipsticks were then sent back to the factory, causing a shortage, so hawkers began



zloty a cake. (The average Polish woman factory worker's wage is 800 zloty a month).

Various raw material scarcities plague the industry and the available supply of cosmetic products is consequently irregular and unpredictable. Typical of this is the toothpaste situation. Until recently, six kinds of toothpaste were being produced at a uniform price of 3.05 zloty per tube. Purchasers must turn in an old tube or pay an additional 1½ zloty, this because the tubes are made of zinc, which is needed for other purposes. And because the glycerine in toothpaste is an essential raw material in armaments manufacture, toothpaste frequently disappears altogether from the market. In 1955 none was available in the Gdansk area for a period of six weeks. Also in 1955 it was discovered that a Warsaw factory had taken advantage of the toothpaste shortage to market an ersatz tooth powder made of chalk. Many customers were cheated and several factory officials were arrested.

selling lipstick at exorbitant prices. Polish lipsticks cost 5.65 zloty apiece, French lipsticks, imported or smuggled in by seamen, 160 zloty apiece.

Polish eau de cologne is sold in 2-gram bottles at six zloty to 200-gram bottles at 70 zloty. Polish perfumes vary in price from 20 to 96 zloty; a 20-gram bottle of French "Chanel" costs 140 zloty. Few people buy Polish perfume, as prices are still high—although they have been reduced several times—and the quality is poor. Face powder is sold in paper bags, at 1.20 zloty for 20 grams.

Poland imports some cosmetics, such as perfumes, creams and lipstick from France and lately from East Germany. Also, large amounts of foreign cosmetics are smuggled into the country by Polish sailors and sold on the black market. In order to give the State a share in this traffic, special State shops have been set up in the Gdynia and Szczecin ports, where sailors may sell their "gifts." The State shops resell the items in special shops at tremendous profit.

We recommend Polish cosmetics and toilet preparations of outstanding quality

I. Dentrifrices containing bacteriocidal substances and dissolving tartar. Our dentrifrices are not injurious to the enamel and teeth

*

II. Hair preparations include shampoo powders, liquid and solidified brilliantine, hair-oil, vegetable hair lotions which prevent dandruff and falling hair, and *Petrol* hair tonic

*

III. Skin creams regenerate the tissue and impart to it a healthy complexion and correct elasticity. These include lanolin cream—effective against wrinkles, cold cream, vitamin creams and medicated creams

*

IV. Powders, produced in more than a dozen shades, are ideally fine and contain no mercury or barium compounds

*

V. Lipsticks available in a wide scale of colours and shades are made on a base of beeswax and specially refined fats

*

VI. The high quality of our perfumes, Eau de Cologne and toilet waters, the aesthetic bottles and presentation packagings in which they are put up, are creating an increasing demand for them in world markets

*

VII. We recommend our special toilet preparations for children and babies—ointments, shampoo powders, skin cream, soap, tooth paste, dusting powders and oil



II. Old Official Version

THE REGIME's claims with respect to the growth and quality of its cosmetics industry four years ago are in sharp contrast to the account given by the refugee expert in 1956. In a special brochure included in the English-language magazine *Polish Foreign Trade*, (Warsaw) No. 19 (5), 1953, the following claims are made: "The development of Poland's chemical industry has, together with the close co-operation of research and experimental laboratories, produced a great expansion of the country's toilet preparations industry. Such propitious circumstances are obviously conducive to the perfection of production methods and to the widening of the range of Polish cosmetics. . . . High-grade precipitated calcium carbonate (*Calcium carbonicum praecipitatum levissimum*) is used in tooth powders and pastes. . . . Effective regulations . . . ensure that Polish skin creams are perfectly harmless, while the use of the

proper fats, careful selection of materials and the long-standing experience of the staff of experts . . . cause Polish creams to challenge even world-reputed foreign products. . . . Polish lipsticks . . . possess a pleasant flavor and delightful fragrance. . . . Perfumes—both popular and luxury . . . include, in addition to flower perfumes, a considerable selection of blended creations. *Barcarolle*, *Sonata*, *Temptation* and *Night Charm*—these are but a few of the names. . . . Cosmetics are prepared under special hygiene regulations, in scrupulously clean and antiseptic conditions, and their use involves no possible risk even to the most delicate skin."

This brochure is addressed to prospective foreign customers; what it states with reference to the availability of these export products may be true. As for the quality of the goods available to the majority of the people and the production difficulties, the refugee's report speaks for itself.



"At the Pragodev factory the buyer from the Children's House, Prague, inspects the latest models of kiddies' clothing, checking carefully on practicability as well as quality."

Czechoslovak Life (Prague), March 1954

terials bought in the black market; but pattern departments, where women can select from a variety of designs

and fabrics with professional advice, have been opened recently in several Soviet bloc department stores.

Although many tailors and seamstresses have been pressed into State cooperatives which sell both ready-to-wear and custom clothes to individual customers and to State retail stores, many others are still able to make a living on their own, and are tolerated by the regimes, although heavily taxed. Of all sectors of the Communist economy, dressmaking has one of the largest numbers of "independent producers." For one thing, they perform a vital service which cannot be mechanized: repairs and remodelling. Women in the Soviet bloc have learned to use considerable skills and ingenuity in prolonging the life and changing the details of their clothes. The life span of a dress or coat is apparently much longer than in the West. Women's magazines give tips on remodelling clothes, making a dress out of a worn coat, putting together one new article out of two old ones. A refugee described the career of a man's suit: when, after long continual wear, a suit becomes threadbare, it is sent to the tailor to be "turned." The suit is worn another year, then returns to the tailor who makes a jacket out of the entire suit. When the jacket is worn out, the tailor converts it again, this time into a short jacket for a woman.

On the whole, the average woman is probably not better but worse off than before the "new line", for she is now under more pressure to be well-dressed, on an income of substantially unchanged purchasing power. However, visitors report that Satellite women make heroic efforts to meet the challenge as well as their strained resources of time and funds will permit.

Beauty Aids

THE USE OF cosmetics was almost completely abandoned in the Stalin era. The whole mode of life was in opposition to artificial beauty aids, both ideologically and materially. Oils and fats needed for the manufacture of cosmetics were lacking, and what cosmetic products existed were exorbitantly expensive, crude, often even damaging. Now women are encouraged to use make up, hair coloring, face creams, etc. Cosmetics are advertised in the press, and the industry is trying to improve the variety and quality. The October 26, 1955 issue of *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest) carried an article by Geza Szilagyi, head of the Vegetable Oil Department of the Ministry of Food Production, describing new skin lotions, indelible lipsticks, face creams, new kinds of eau de cologne and hair rinses for touching up gray hair. Instead of the old completely standardized face soap, cakes of different colors and scents were to be produced. New factory branches are engaged exclusively in the production of perfume bottles, boxes and jars for creams, holders for lipsticks and other items.

As cosmetics are still expensive, great emphasis is placed on home-made products. Newspapers and magazines feature regular beauty aid columns offering instructions for making at home all sorts of beauty aids such as egg, yeast, camomile packs, cream baths, etc. A woman refugee reported that in Poland face cream cost 20 *zloty* for a jar which lasted only two weeks; an average woman with a 700-*zloty* monthly income could not afford it.

The State-run beauty shops are represented as besieged by the people. However, visitors and refugees report that prices are extremely high and service poor.

The "long expected" arrival of a variety of Soviet perfumes in limited quantities at leading Prague shops was hailed in *Lidova Demokracie* (Prague), January 9, 1957. The paper said that the perfumes are "comparatively cheap considering their quality" and noted with approval their "strong but pleasant scent" and their "poetic" names: "Fire of Moscow," "Friendship," "Carmen," "Violet," "Harvest Festival," and "Kremlin."

FROM THE COMMUNIST PRESS:

“For the Dignity of Science”

By Leopold Infeld

Przeglad Kulturalny (Warsaw), June 21-27, 1956

TWO REMARKS before I turn to my main topic. In the first place, the aim of what I am writing here is not criticism for the sake of criticism. Brooding over the errors of the past for the sake of brooding is futile and unnecessary, but only through an open and candid discussion of errors shall we be able to get rid of the bitterness accumulated in the hearts and minds of many of us; only in this way shall we be able to remove the wall standing between many scientists and the Socialist system which we want to build together.

In the second place, what I am writing here is critical. However, it does not mean that I do not appreciate the support owed by Polish science to the Party and to the government in the past period, or that I do not appreciate certain real achievements of our Polish Academy of Sciences which will be my main subject here.

Since the beginning of the Polish Academy of Sciences we have been given as models worthy of following not Copernicus, not Skłodowska-Curie, not Smoluchowski, but Lysenko and Lepieshinskaya. I am not a biologist and I know about the work of these scientists only from my talks with biologists. Still, it is not necessary to be a biologist to be skeptical with respect to the proposition that soda baths are the fountain of youth. However, the problem itself does not matter to me now, at this moment. It does not matter now whether Lysenko was right or wasn't. For the time being I am interested in the methods introduced by him into the world of science, and their echo in Poland.

There is an English word for which there is no equivalent in the Polish language. It is the word "bully." The verb derived from this is "to bully." A "bully" is a domestic tyrant, a petty tyrant, a brutal man who imposes his will upon others by means of shouting, and if this is not enough, by means of kicking and beating—literal beating or mental beating . . .

When I was still on the American continent, I read the text of a lecture by Lysenko given by him in 1948 and subsequently published in English. After the lecture a question was put: "What did the Party think about his views?" Lysenko answered that the Party took a stand for his views and his teachings. During my short stay in Poland in 1949 I got the impression that, after all, in Poland there was a different situation, and that in our country the Lysenko methods were not applied to scientists. Perhaps Professor Dembowski remembers the dinner we had together, during which we discussed this problem, so very painful for me then: the problem of Lysenko. How this



PROFESSOR LEOPOLD INFELD — for many years close associate of Albert Einstein — is now a member of the Presidium of the Polish Academy of Sciences and head of the Institute of Theoretical Physics at the Warsaw University

Poland (Warsaw), No. 2 (18), 1956

problem subsequently rebounded in Polish biology, we are being told in the article by Petrusewicz and Michajlov printed in *Nowe Drogi*, in September of last year.

I quote from this article: "What was the final result? Often it was superficiality and generality in our propaganda, sometimes it was dogmatic pronouncement instead of reasoning and proving, generally it was assertiveness. But we went still farther. Not being able always to persuade, we used to have recourse to ordering people about, administrative pressure, closing the columns of periodicals to our opponents, etc." These forms of "bully" pressure, which, according to the authors were applied in Poland, do not need any comment. However, the article itself struck me rather unpleasantly. It was written without any doubts whatsoever. On the other hand, it seems to me that there are also correct formulations in this article. I agree entirely with what the authors wrote about the relation of the

Party to science. We read in this article: "It is also obvious that the Party cannot take any stand on particular scientific issues, let alone decide on scientific issues. It can only contribute to their solution by helping in the organization of research, by encouraging creative discussions based upon fundamental principles of dialectical materialism."

But the authors do not draw any conclusions from their own premises—one would like to add, in the authors' style, "the only right conclusions." These would be: those who want to decide on behalf of the Party upon the controversies between Lysenko and the Morganists abuse the authority of the Party. Scientific controversies in biology can be solved only by experiment.

A biologist whom I consulted in these matters wrote to me:

"This sad period is about to reach its end. In the Soviet Union and in our country as well, the works of Lysenko and Boshian and Lepieshinskaya have been rejected after discussion and scientific criticism. But the effects of this period continue to endure to a great extent. And it is our duty as scientists to liquidate them in the most speedy manner. If we take biology as a science, and not as a social function, then there cannot be two biologies: the new one and the formalistic one, the Soviet one and the Western one. There is only one biology—the one created by facts taken from reality; the one based upon honest, competently managed scientific research.

"In order to ensure that such a biology develop in our country, we must guarantee to all scientists in Poland a situation in which genuine freedom of research will prevail and scientific dishonesty and careerism will be unable to exist."

I will give another example. As a result of the discussion on the theory of the structure of organic particles that took place in the Soviet Union in the years 1949-1950, the Pauling theory of resonance was condemned as being idealistic.

Pauling is a great chemist, a Nobel Prize winner, one of the pioneers in the application of quantum mechanics in chemistry. . . .

It is a fact that at that time—in the early 50's—the theory of resonance was unknown to Polish chemists because to understand it one must be thoroughly acquainted with wave mechanics. This theory was even more zealously criticized in Poland when critics were told that those parts of the theory unknown to them were allegedly "Machist" [Ernst Mach, 1838-1916, an Austrian physicist and philosopher, criticized strongly by Lenin]. A characteristic feature of the critical opinions published in Polish periodicals, as well as in the materials of the conference of chemists held in Bierutowice in 1952, was unfamiliarity with and lack of understanding of the mechanism of the condemned theory. A well-known chemist, who participated in the discussion, said that one might as well abandon the theory of resonance if only because it could not be experimentally demonstrated. Were we to be guided by this approach, we should have to abandon all of contemporary physics.

A colleague of mine who is well acquainted with these

problems wrote to me: "The participants in the discussion at the Bierutowice Conference revealed in their opinions their unfamiliarity with the elementary notions of quantum mechanics and their applications. The false views as regards the contemporary state of theory in organic chemistry are still very much alive even today."

I come now to the third problem, the one which is nearest to me personally. It is the subject of the theory of relativity, and the subject of Einstein. Thus, in the Short Dictionary of Philosophy [*Krotki Słownik Filozoficzny*], a publication which will remain a monument of shame of the past period, we look in vain for an article with the heading "Einstein." Neither has this name been included in the article "Space and Time" in which, however, we find the names of Butlerov and Fyodorov.

Before I unfold this story, I must add here a very essential note. It is hardly possible to underestimate Soviet science, its gigantic development, in spite of the dark sides about which I am going to speak. The reason for this is



"Trofim Denisovich Lysenko . . . outstanding Soviet student, biologist and agronomist, Academician since 1939, active member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences since 1934, active member since 1935 and President since 1938 of the V. I. Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Science. Hero of Socialist Labor (1945), three Stalin Prize Winner (1941, 1943, 1949), Deputy of Supreme Soviet of the USSR. . . . The Michurinist studies developed by Lysenko and other Soviet biologists were born and grew in an unceasing struggle with all types of reactionary idealistic biological theories. . . . [He] exposed the essence of the reactionary idealistic direction in biology—Weissmannism (Mendelism, Morganism). . . ." *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, Second Edition, vol. 25, pp. 498-499; Moscow: January 1954. Lysenko's theories, unassailable dogma while Stalin lived, have since Stalin's death been open to discussion, and even attacked as unscientific quackery.



Leopold Infeld with Albert Einstein

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that this science is being developed by modest and quiet people, such as Wexler, Landau and Tamm, and not by bullies of the Lysenko kind. Now the Twentieth Congress has removed the fetters imposed upon science by those bullies who thought it the proper thing to elevate Soviet science by degrading non-Russian science. Science is international and scientists of all countries should cooperate with one another for its development.

Our friendship with the Soviet Union is a very important matter from the economic point of view, from the point of view of maintaining peace and from the point of view of the development of science. This is known and recognized in Poland. But a very bad service was rendered to the cause of this friendship by those who have been constantly proclaiming Russian priority for every idea, whether important or not. By this officiousness they have made ridiculous Soviet science, which has gained one of the leading positions in the world even without their shouting. Soviet science was made almost ridiculous in Poland, and a bad service was rendered to the cause of our friendship with the Soviet Union, by those who in our country adopted the loudest opinions, the least objective opinions, and emphasized them with their own even louder shouting and noise. How many times was I approached by very young people with the question as to whether Mendeleev and Pavlov were really great sci-

tists! This is the result, and it was symbolized by writing about Butlerov and Fyodorov and not about Einstein in the article on space and time, or by attributing in this dictionary the discovery of the famous equation $E = mc^2$ to Lebyedev and Vavilov and not to Einstein. Incidentally, this dictionary has been published in Polish and it is being used, unfortunately, by all our post-graduate students of sciences.

In the Soviet Union, some philosophers—and it might be more proper to say “quotologists”—have unleashed a storm against the theory of relativity because it is idealistic. How about this theory—they argued—and its assertion that there is no difference between the theory of Copernicus and that of Ptolemy? So, according to Einstein, Giordano Bruno and Galileo suffered needlessly from the Inquisition, and therefore Einstein should be classified, as one of the reviews has called him, a “popovshchik” [priest-follower]. This argument was repeated many times by the quotologists, but of all physicists known to me in the East or in the West there was only one serious supporter of it, and he had his own theory, not recognized by other physicists, modifying the theory of relativity.

What was the echo of these facts in Poland? The articles by quotologists were translated into Polish; generally speaking, people in Poland have been seeing Soviet physics in a crooked mirror. These problems were presented as

if the quotologists were right. Great Soviet scientists such as Wexler, Landau, Tamm, have been shouted down by the stentorian voices of the bullies and quotologists.

In 1953, a scientific session was held in Poland on the 410th anniversary of the death of Copernicus. The Academy of Sciences, while preparing this session, had to choose between two paths. It could either invite someone living in Poland who had spent many years on the relativistic Copernican problem, or it could invite someone who would not say anything contrary to the opinion of the shouters and quotologists. I am anxious to say here explicitly that I accuse the Academy of having chosen this second possibility. Therefore, that solemn session became a travesty of scientific gatherings. Professor Banachiewicz, then our one living astromoner of world fame and renown, did not speak at these meetings.

And now another recollection of that period. I remember a session organized by the Academy in the Sejm [Parliament] building and devoted to the works of Stalin. At one point a physicist took part in the discussion. He explicitly criticized Einstein, Bohr, Dirac as idealistic physicists. Professor Pienkowski, who was seated next to me, whispered in my ear: "Idealistic physics isn't doing badly to have produced people of that caliber." In fact, the attack by that colleague had very little—not to say nothing—in common with the defense of Marxist positions. He took his arguments from the quotologists armed with selected sentences from the works of Marx and Engels. But these great creators of dialectical materialism could not foresee the direction of the development of physics, which turned out to be so different in the Twentieth century from what it had been in the Nineteenth.

The period of ignorance has come to an end, let us hope forever. The Soviet Union is now going through a period of renaissance in the physical sciences because the fetters that were slowing down their development have been removed. To a great extent public accessibility has been restored to Soviet science. Cooperation with other countries is becoming increasingly wider, increasingly explicit. For me the symbol of Soviet science is not the discovery by Lysenko of the rye in the wheat (or perhaps it was the other way around) but Wexler's synchrotron ten billion electron volts strong—the greatest discovery in scientific technique of our times. Let us hope that this renaissance of science will also soon take place in our country.


Let us go on now to other problems. The Academy of the German Democratic Republic every year spends fifty percent of its general budget for its research in the fields of chemistry and physics. In our country last year this proportion was only five percent! But in the Central Office of our Academy there are over 400 people employed in administrative work whereas in the Central Office of the GDR Academy there are only 45 people. That means that we have almost ten times as many people in the administrative corps!

I have learned that the planning division in our Academy employs ten people whose main function is to make for confusion in the departments and research centers. I have also learned that the personnel department employs fifteen people and on top of that the employment department employs eight people; incidentally this personnel department probably exists only to make personnel matters so confused that no research center or department should be capable of finding its way and of knowing what it has at its disposal.

It is also a fact that many periodicals and papers are luxuriously printed and since they have only propaganda as their aim, no one reads them either in our country or abroad. "Polish Science" is published in Polish, Russian and English! Reports on activities and operations of the Polish Academy of Sciences! The history of science! Many publications on publications! The center for distributing scientific publications has grown large as a Moloch; it also distributes luxuriously printed reports on its own activities. The second Moloch is the bibliography department; it publishes great numbers of analyses. Bibliography as a research tool should have its place in the Academy. But its scope should be limited by the genuine demands of research. However, millions are being spent on analytical bibliography and hardly anyone reads all this. Like mistletoe on a tree this bibliography feeds on our science and eats up money necessary for the development of science. But when a tree dies, the mistletoe goes with it too. How much good it would be possible to do with the millions wasted, I repeat, wasted, on bibliography! How many scholarships would it be possible to give to young scientists! For how many young scientists would it be possible to study abroad! How many among them would it be possible to liberate from material worries! We forget today that these young and gifted scientific workers represent the tomorrow of Polish science. We forget that living people are more important than dead bibliography.

The improvement in this field depends to a great extent on the Presidium of the Academy. It is already high time that the Presidium takes into its own hands the helm of the Academy and ceases to be, as heretofore, a rubber-stamp of the Secretariat. We should fight for the democratization of our institution. We should fight against the principle of secrecy in the sciences in all cases where secrecy functions only as a screen for ignorance. We should fight for the principle that Polish science should be under the guidance of scientists, and not of administrators who do not understand its needs. We should fight for educating more personnel, especially in those branches which are understaffed. We should fight against insincerity and mendacity of which we still have, unfortunately, too much. We should fight for the rebirth of scientific thought in order that there should be no retreat toward that ignorance on the fringe of which we dwelt for the last five years. We should fight for the dignity and the future of Polish science.

Eyewitness



Reports...

This section presents current information on conditions in East Europe from refugees and others interviewed by Radio Free Europe reporters.

FROM A SYNTHESIS of first-hand accounts—some by Western journalists and businessmen who had visited Poland, and some by Polish intellectuals close to events and leaders in their country—a pattern of public opinion, popular beliefs, and prevailing rumors and predictions during and after Poland's October Revolution can be discerned.

In general, the people on all levels of Polish life at this time expressed admiration for Gomulka's political skill in dealing with the Soviets, uncertainty about his ability to handle the economic crisis, and misgivings about the state of his health (there were many rumors that he is suffering from advanced tuberculosis). Most observers hold that Gomulka's political future rests upon his success in improving material conditions in the country, mainly through securing a loan from the United States and a revision of trade agreements with the Soviet Union. Gomulka is not regarded as an economic expert. It is believed that he relies heavily on several young economists from the group of "Economic Life" (an economic periodical), whose ideas he used as the basis for his statements on the Polish economy at the Eighth Plenum.

At the end of October, a member of an official delegation from Poland to a West European capital made the prediction that the first result of Gomulka's return would be a rapid growth of private initiative in the economy. This was not a question of what Gomulka wished: the trend of future developments is being determined by public opinion, he stressed. So far, public pressure has been ahead of the liberal wing of the Communist Party, and, it is thought, will continue to be so. Small handicrafts and privately-owned shops will develop rapidly, the lack of accommodations being overcome by such devices as converting passageways between buildings into workshops and stores.

Shortages of food, fuel and other consumer supplies were reported throughout the country to varying degrees; Poznan, for example, being only slightly affected, Warsaw gravely so. One Western visitor reported that the only

consumption goods not scarce in Warsaw were "apples and newspapers." It was widely rumored that the Gomulka government tolerated and even favored the panic buying and hoarding during the critical days of the Eighth Plenum, as a means of getting food supplies into the hands of the populace in case of an armed conflict with the Soviets.

A British journalist in Poland compared the Polish sentiment toward the Russians to the attitude of the Arabs toward the English, with Rokossowski cast in the role of "a Soviet Glubb Pasha." A Polish-speaking West European musician who visited the country found that the attitude was anti-Russian, but not necessarily pro-Western. This seemed to be related primarily to the question of Poland's Western border. Thus Gomulka's appeal for Polish-Soviet friendship found acceptance in the name of political realism. In the period which followed Gomulka's accession to power a sharp differentiation was developing in public opinion between Gomulka's personal popularity and the system of Communism. In the words of one correspondent, it was "not Gomulka the Communist, but Gomulka the Pole" who had won popular allegiance. Gomulka's declaration in support of the Kadar regime in Hungary caused considerable indignation and loss of confidence among the people.

The influence of the Polish journalists in fomenting the revolution, and of the Catholic clergy in keeping it a peaceful one, was universally recognized. It was commonly believed that the Stalinist, or Natolin, group was attempting to provoke disturbances; everyone was leery of "provocateurs" and provocations.



BY ALL UNOFFICIAL accounts the situation in journalism in Poland is highly complex because of the discrepancy between the role of the press as a regime organ and the actual ideas of the majority of its members. In spite of the thaw and a certain relaxation of censorship,

the press is still subject to control. But long before the Eighth Plenum entire editorial staffs were known to refuse to write articles and notices ordered from above or to attend press conferences for certain redefectors.

It is characteristic that among the journalists, just as in other circles and associations, it was the younger generation which showed the spirit of rebellion. The young editors of the weekly *Poprostu* are generally regarded as the most devoted and idealistic among young Communists. *Poprostu* was the first newspaper to attack Poland's key political and economic problems. Owing to its campaign, a large number of people who had been growing increasingly dissatisfied with regime policies began to consider the weekly their spokesman.

After the article "Behind the Golden Drapes" (exposing bureaucratic privilege) was published in the spring of 1956 (republished in this magazine's October 1956 issue), the staff of *Poprostu* was reportedly called before the Party Central Committee. Government and Party representatives wished to impose "a more careful way of expressing opinions" on the paper. However, according to a first-hand account of this, the atmosphere was quite friendly and the following exchange almost jocular:

"Do you want to provoke people into demonstrating in the streets?"

"If there is no other way, then the answer is yes, we do!"

"Don't forget that we have tanks."

"... which also belong to the people."

The Poznan riots occurred three months later.

As in the whole Party, so among the *Poprostu* editors there exists a minority group of the Party orthodox. Sharp ideological arguments often take place. It was reported that after the Poznan riots Lasota, the editor-in-chief of *Poprostu*, was dismissed on Ochab's orders. The editors of *Poprostu* protested Lasota's removal and after violent discussion he was reinstated by Ochab.

According to many observers, the change in the outlooks of Polish journalists and intellectuals was brought about primarily by their visits to the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly the Twentieth Congress was a turning point which influenced the formation of new ideas among the young Communists, but above all they revised their views when confronted with actual Soviet life.

THE CONDITION and fate of Polish repatriates from the USSR has been dramatically pictured by many first-hand observers. The repatriates from Russia travel for the most part in closed transport cars, several score in each car. At border points these cars are attached to trains travelling in the direction of Warsaw or the Western Territories. The transports seen by a young woman who recently arrived in West Germany from Poland were composed mainly of elderly people in tatters, the men heavily bearded, unshaven for weeks.

But even more striking than the wretchedness of their appearance, she said, is the apathy of the people, who ceased long ago to believe that they would ever return to

Poland. They sit quietly, speaking little or not at all, and do not react to the bustle and excitement of Warsaw. They receive people's gifts and services in silence. "They give the impression of people who have cried out all their tears." The most active are their children, who chatter in Russian, and greedily grab the rolls with margarine or the candy offered them. Some spectators, seeing these grim transports of emotionally destroyed people, burst into tears. Someone in the crowd said loudly: "Take these miserable people to Gomulka; let him see what has been done to them."

The young woman added that some of the smaller transports have been taken to Lower Silesia (Western Territories), where the repatriates were to be settled. It turned out, however, that the relocating would not be so easy. A few years ago the authorities sold slightly damaged German houses for a nominal price to "professionals" who would dismantle them for the bricks which were then sold. Today there is no place to put the newcomers from the East, although the local population is eager to help.

■ ■ ■
OBservers report that the Soviet Army garrison in Wilno (in the Soviet-annexed prewar Polish Eastern Territories) was doubled after Gomulka's rise for fear of demonstrations.

By the beginning of December, the Polish character of the town was being reassured. Poles living there ceased concealing their nationality and language. The events in Poland particularly affected the Wilno youth, not only Polish but also the Russian and Lithuanian. These were reportedly preparing demonstrations in concert but abandoned them because of the threatening attitude of the Soviet armed forces.

■ ■ ■
ACCORDING TO businessmen in Western Europe, the Polish authorities are apparently unofficially turning over a part of the activities of the centralized State foreign trade bureau to private firms. At present they are trying to establish more definitive lines of this activity. For example the State enterprise "Animex" reportedly is to turn over the export of canned goods to private firms. Polish prewar businessmen are entering the import-export field on their own and are making contacts with firms in Sweden and West Germany. In one reported case they made trade proposals to a colleague in Sweden who escaped from Poland in 1948. In letters and telephone conversations they made it clear that the fact that he was a refugee from Communism had no bearing on the establishment of a trade relationship with Poland. Several other persons from Poland are also engaged in negotiating with Sweden on the subject of importing tools for the wood industry, machinery for automobile manufacture, etc. In these discussions the businessmen in Poland declared that there are great opportunities for expanding these activities, that the Polish authorities tacitly back all private arrangements which will activate trade exchange with the West. One Polish businessman said in a telephone conversation that it was expected that the regime would take steps substantially to

restore the private sector of light industry, apart from the already expressed intention to restore private handicrafts and services.

■ ■ ■

THE ATTITUDE and behavior of Soviet troops in the Hungarian uprising has been commented upon by many eyewitnesses. Soviet military participation evidently fell into two categories. Soviet troops which had been stationed in Hungary for several years were passive and in many cases sympathetic toward the fighting rebels. For example, the commander of a tank unit in one area stated publicly that the Hungarians had never harmed him or his family, and his children attended Hungarian schools; he assured the rebels that his unit would not fire on Hungarians. Another tank commander reportedly handed over nine tanks to the patriots without firing a shot. A total of 35 to 40 tanks were reported ceded to the Hungarian insurgents by the Soviet troops. One eyewitness said that when the AVH (Hungarian security police) first fired into the unarmed demonstrators in front of the Parliament building, Soviet tanks stationed in that area opened fire on the AVH. Individual Soviet officers and soldiers openly expressed sympathy with the patriots, refused to shoot at them and in some cases defected to them.

Soviet troops which entered Hungary after November 4, on the other hand, were regular combat troops, mostly of Central Asian origin. Some of these soldiers, according to many reports, had expected that they were going to Egypt to fight; they were, in the words of one refugee, "looking for crocodiles in the Danube." Russian troops garrisoned in Hungary feared the arrival of the new troops as much as the Hungarians did, the refugee said.

Many former freedom fighters reported that during the actual fighting in Hungary, the Soviet troops had virtually no food supplies. Soviet soldiers were allegedly willing to pay 100 *forint* for a loaf of bread. Refugees who crossed into Austria near Hegyeshalom stated that Soviet soldiers escorted them across the border in return for some potatoes, apples and bread.

■ ■ ■

A PROFESSOR from Györ gave the following survey of the peasants' position during the Hungarian revolt. In his view the revolution belonged primarily to the towns, to the workers and students. The rural villages generally remained quiet. Yet this was largely outward appearance, as many village youths, owing to difficult agricultural conditions, had been working in factories for many years and thus were effectively part of the revolutionary workers. This also applied to the village youths who had joined the army or were attending the universities.

At the Györ demonstrations many trucks from the villages took part. But the villages, according to this source, only reached the stage of setting up National Councils. The Party Secretaries and Chairmen of the local councils were replaced. Only those who had treated the people decently were permitted to remain. New members were elected from among the youth. There were no reports of abuses or bloodshed.

Having set up their councils, the peasants apparently waited. Their demands were easily formulated. They wanted, apart from the general demands in the national interest, free production and sale and the abolition of compulsory delivery quotas. The kolkhozes which had been formed by force were immediately liquidated, the livestock and equipment redistributed and the regrouping (commassation) of land declared void. In Györ-Sopron County only a few kolkhozes were kept, in accordance with the decision of the members. Those who chose to remain in the kolkhozes were all former farm laborers who, owing to lack of experience and equipment, were afraid to undertake farming individually.

In the professor's opinion, the peasantry, with its ingrained caution, did not altogether trust the revolution. On the afternoon of the "triumphant Friday" (October 26?) he met a number of rural acquaintances in Györ. They agreed, almost without exception, that this was not "our"—the peasants—revolution yet; it was still in the hands of Communists. Yet they were enthusiastic. Despite their reservations they declared that if they could get arms they would go to Budapest to help in the fighting.

The same partial reserve was characteristic of the villages in the field of party politics. The old members of the old parties started to take action, but the peasants expected something different and, in the professor's words, remained "buttoned up." He believes that possibly the peasantry was divided politically but it was completely united on one point: in order to safeguard its economic interests it had to form a homogeneous organization. The revival of the Peasant Association was thus received with great joy.

■ ■ ■

ECHOES IN Czechoslovakia of the Polish and Hungarian upheavals, and regime measures to counter their effects, were described by foreign visitors to the country in late October and November. The Czechoslovak people appeared anxious, poorly informed about the events in Poland and Hungary, and eager for news. Foreign stations, including Radio Warsaw, were heavily jammed. Polish, and to a lesser extent Yugoslav, newspapers were in great demand. Since these papers had vanished from newsstands—it was believed that they were being withheld by the regime—people were offering considerable sums of money and even shoes to Polish railway employees for them.

Czechoslovakia's Polish border, which had been open during the past year, was sealed. It was widely known in Prague that Czechoslovak troops were moved to the Hungarian border at the outbreak of the rioting in Budapest. It was rumored that more than 250 Czechoslovak subjects of Hungarian nationality were imprisoned in Bratislava because they tried to return to Hungary at the beginning of the revolution. In Kosice 300 refugee AVH (Hungarian security policemen) members were reportedly being treated at the Kosice hospital. Their presence caused serious overcrowding and the prohibition of visitors.

YOU GOT TO ROCK

THE FOLLOWING bemused comments were made over Radio Warsaw, February 16:

"I recently read the observations of an American correspondent in Warsaw to the effect that the Polish press has been acquiring a Western look, and citing an advertisement in a newspaper proclaiming that 'hot beer is good for bad chests.' Any kind of drink is always popular in our country and that in itself is not a symptom of the liberalization of life. But his remarks about the more attractive look of the Polish press are correct.

"The October Revolution had a purely political character and it would seem that there was no logical connection between the Gomulka ideas and the kind of advertisements carried in newspapers. But there is a connection. Perhaps the loosening of the situation at the highest levels of politics has liberated some reflexes and tendencies at all levels of social life. . . .

"One can easily accept the small advertisements such as appeared in *Zycie Warszawy*. But what occupied a paragraph a few months ago now covers the entire page. It is still a long way from the many pages of advertisements in the *Times* or in *Le Soir* of Brussels, but the spontaneous expansion of this field is beyond doubt.

"Let us take a look at *Zycie Warszawy*: there is a two-column advertisement of a German firm inviting the public to see its exhibit at the Leipzig Fair and also an ad for a car auction. Advertisements for various new newspapers are appearing like mushrooms after the rain—from the *Monthly Statistical Review* to the new comic book for children edited along the lines of American comics. What has happened? Where were all these tendencies before? What is the connection between Gomulka's ideas and the comics?

"While the connection can be understood between the October reforms and the growing number of various business advertisements, which show some restoration of previously condemned private enterprise, the connection between October and a series of pictures of the French actress Brigitte Bardot in a state of undress cannot be fathomed at all. Competition in this field may bring excellent results—if only Brigitte Bardot has time to put clothes on.

"One is not so much shocked as dazed. Yesterday, my wife read to me an advertisement by the Ciebzewski broth-



"Warsaw strip-tease"

Szpileki (Warsaw), February 17, 1957

ers who have started mass instruction in a new Polish, Socialist way to rock and roll. If this is connected with the equally Polish strip-tease, I think I will pass it up. Here in Poland, they can strip you in the street, wallet and all. What times these are!"

Immediately after reading the above, the announcer said: "After describing these changes, we will now play a few jazz records currently popular in Poland, starting with a 'rock 'n roll.' "

Frozen Stiff

A JOKE ABOUT the giant Stalin statue in Prague raises the question of why Stalin is depicted in a Napoleonic pose. The answer is that he himself climbed on the pedestal to survey the site, and was reaching in his breast pocket to contribute something toward the cost of the future statue, when someone told him what the Czechoslovak citizens had been called upon to subscribe. The size of the sum mentioned turned Stalin to stone.

Current Developments

Area

Bloc Relations with Yugoslavia

Relations between Yugoslavia and most of the nations of the Soviet bloc remained strained in recent weeks and were marked by mutual accusations and recriminations. The essence of the dispute was the abandonment by the Soviet leadership of a number of basic premises enunciated at the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress and the Yugoslavs' insistence that these premises—a thorough renunciation of Stalinism, separate roads to "Socialism," peaceful ideological competition, etc.—must prevail, both internally as well as in the relations between "Socialist" countries. Each side has found little room for maneuver: the Hungarian Revolt and the Polish events have forced the Soviets to reject "national Communism" as a viable concept for the preservation of the Soviet Empire and, in turn, the harder line has compelled the Yugoslavs to divorce themselves ideologically from their newly-found friends so as to maintain their key position as a separate entity outside any camp. Each side has therefore been adamant, but apparently somewhat regrettably so.

With rare exceptions, the insults and hyperboles of the Stalinist era have not been used; more often than not the recriminations are tinged with pain. Further, all other relations not directly linked to key ideological concepts have been maintained and in some instances are even being strengthened—even though Moscow may have been using retaliatory pressure in delaying implementation of economic agreements reached last year.

Another remarkable aspect of the current dispute, as opposed to the previous feud, is the lack of uniformity in the campaign. Albanians have been fiercest and rudest, far more so than the USSR itself; they were followed in the intensity of their attacks by the Bulgarians. The Soviets and Romanians have maintained a middle ground with a number of critical assertions, all couched in polite language and without overt threats. The Czechoslovaks have contented themselves with reprints of these comments from Moscow and Bucharest, without adding any of their own. The Hungarians, busy with their own internal difficulties, have maintained a discreet silence. Finally, the Poles, who in the past made it very clear that they felt increasingly sympathetic with Yugoslav views on almost all topics, have retracted none of their praise, though they have been no-



Polish leaders taking Parliamentary oath at the opening of the new Sejm session. The oath was as follows: "As a Deputy to the Sejm of the Polish People's Republic, I solemnly pledge to work for the good of the Polish nation, to deepen its unity, to participate in the strengthening of bonds between the State authority and the working people of cities and countryside, to do everything possible for the consolidation of independence and sovereignty, and for the prosperous development of the Polish People's Republic."

Picture from front page of *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw),
February 24, 1957.

ticably reluctant in recent weeks to express their feelings openly, probably fearing Soviet reactions.

The latest exchange between Moscow and Belgrade was sparked by a February 12 keynote speech by the then Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, D. Shepilov. He said, *inter alia*:

"We shall continue taking all necessary steps to make Soviet-Yugoslav relations develop successfully on the basis of friendship and equality. At present, however, this depends chiefly on the leaders of the Yugoslav Republic, inasmuch as in Yugoslavia there are still manifestations of ill will and even open attacks by certain elements against the USSR and a number of People's Democracies. We regret this because such facts undoubtedly hamper our common cause."

Kommunist's Complaints

The ideological frame for this attack was set in the Jan-

uary 17 issue of *Kommunist* (Moscow), the Soviet Party's theoretical journal, in an article entitled "The Development of Socialism and Proletarian Internationalism":

"Some of the statements of the Yugoslav comrades, regardless of their subjective intentions, did not contribute either to a consolidation of the ranks of the Communist movement or to improving the activities of the Party. . . . It was proved . . . that these statements revealed an extremely one-sided approach to the activities of fraternal Parties and their experience in building Socialism; the positive aspects were completely disregarded and only the negative aspects were cited."

An editorial in the same issue of the magazine accused the Yugoslavs of revising Marxist-Leninist principles and of wanting to do away with the "historic experience of the CPSU."

To these charges, and to Shepilov's attack, the major Yugoslav papers replied on February 13 with the assertion that there was a general tendency to isolate and ostracise Yugoslavia. *Tanyug*, the official press service, said that if relations between the countries had deteriorated, it was up to the Soviet Union to show good will to effect their improvement.

A more sharply defined presentation of the official Belgrade position was made on February 28, when Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Koca Popovic declared that the Soviet Union had been falsely using ideological arguments to squelch political independence and self-reliance:

"We do not want to join the Socialist [i.e., Soviet] camp because this would not be in accordance with the determined principles, direction and objectives of our foreign policy, nor would it be in accordance with the general interests of peace and Socialism. . . . [But this] should not make good and friendly relations among our countries impossible or more difficult. . . .

"During the campaign of polemics which has been conducted against Yugoslavia and its policy by the Soviet Union and certain leading circles in the East European countries, nothing has been subjected to more violent attack than our independent, non-bloc policy of peaceful coexistence. Our policy is blamed because of our cooperation with all countries, especially our cooperation with all trends and forces of the workers' movement. It is reproached with being anti-Marxist or un-Marxist, opportunist, revisionist and so forth. Regardless of the ideological terminology . . . substance for these charges is missing."

Hungary Stand Reiterated

Popovic asserted that his government stands by its appraisal of the Hungarian uprising as a genuinely democratic movement in its early days. He charged that no serious analysis of the events had yet been offered by those who consider the entire Revolt a counterrevolutionary adventure. As for future relations, he said:

"The fact remains that different views and attitudes on the concepts of the Socialist camp and even on the role of Stalin and Stalinism need not represent obstacles to the development of friendly relations and cooperation. But if this is, nevertheless, considered a reason which makes such a development impossible, then it only confirms the fact



"See, they have rehabilitated him!"

Express Wieczorny (Warsaw), December 23-26, 1956

that the true reasons for the dispute are not to be found in these differences."

Popovic also revealed his country's disappointment at the Soviet move in renegeing on an agreement for Soviet credits to develop Yugoslavia's aluminum industry. A Radio Moscow broadcast to Yugoslavia in Serbo-Croat on March 4 said the matter had only been postponed, but Popovic maintained that the Soviets had suddenly offered unacceptable terms.

The Foreign Secretary's remarks brought a prompt but unexpected reply. An editorial printed originally in *Scintia* (Bucharest) on March 3, and reprinted in *Pravda* (Moscow) on March 6 and, in part, in *Rude Pravo* (Prague) on March 8, made extensive references to the speech and to Yugoslavia in general. The editorial restricted itself to matters of foreign policy, and while it continued to condemn Belgrade for undermining the unity of the "Socialist" countries, its criticism tended to be comparatively mild and conciliatory.

The editorial chided Popovic for allegedly making no distinction between the aims of the Soviet bloc and those of the free world and intimated that Yugoslavia was being unreasonable in insisting on its "non-bloc" position.

In Bulgaria and Albania, the attacks have tended to become so crude that a similar compromise, if at all contemplated, will be far more difficult to effect. The beginning of February saw a heated controversy on "roads to Socialism" appearing in the pages of *Trud* (Sofia) and *Borba* (Belgrade). In addition, during the visit of the Bulgarian leaders to Moscow (see p. 44), Radio Belgrade (February 21) assailed a speech allegedly delivered by Premier Anton Yugov at a Soviet reception. The broadcast accused Yugov of having called Yugoslavia an enemy of "Socialism," and of having said that the Yugoslavs bewail the fact that what happened in Hungary and Poland did not also hap-

pen in Bulgaria. (These remarks were also attributed to Yugov by Warsaw's *Sztandar Młodych*.) The broadcast asked if, under these conditions, Belgrade could trust the Soviet-Bulgarian resolution calling for better relations with Yugoslavia.

As we go to press, indications appear that the stiff Bulgarian line toward Yugoslavia may be softening and that the Sofia regime is falling in step with the relatively mild criticism of Belgrade currently being aired by Moscow, Prague and Bucharest. In a speech to the National Assembly (Radio Sofia, March 11), Premier Anton Yugov said:

"Regardless of certain differences between Yugoslav leaders and ourselves over certain fundamental problems stemming from the contemporary international situation, from problems concerning mutual relations among the Socialist countries and the unity of the Socialist camp, from different approaches to these problems and to certain basic problems of Marxism-Leninism, we think that relations between the two countries may be and must be improved and expanded. Of course, this does not depend solely upon us."

Albanian Accusations

Albania was the country most outspoken in its criticism of Belgrade, continuing its long-standing condemnation of the Yugoslavs. In his February 17 speech to the Party's Central Committee (see p. 49), First Party Secretary Enver Hoxha declared that Yugoslavia had "brutally" interfered in the affairs of Albania, adding: "The Yugoslav leaders have adopted an anti-Marxist attitude toward our Party, our State, and our people." Hoxha charged that during the 1948-1953 period (the period of Stalin's effort to subdue Tito) and afterward, Yugoslavia "worked [against Albania] with every means at its disposal, including infiltration" of armed groups into the country, using the border areas as bases of operation. He also asserted that:

"The leaders of Yugoslavia . . . have devised a whole theoretical system to prove that the Communist Parties must go their separate ways. If we consider this in connection with their theories and claims concerning 'the great international role of Yugoslavia' and the 'Yugoslav way to Socialism,' we will come to the conclusion that the Communist Parties should sever their international links with the USSR and gather around Yugoslavia. This point of view of the Yugoslav leaders is completely in opposition to the principles of proletarian internationalism and to the unity of international Communism."

In the above-mentioned speech by Yugoslavia's Foreign Minister, the latter referred to these attacks with ill-concealed ire, terming them crude and unreasonable. Popovic also remarked that Albania was the only country in the area with which it had been impossible to normalize relations after Stalin's death.

Poland, on the other hand, tried to extend a hand in friendship as far as it could under present circumstances. For instance, when Premier Cyrankiewicz presented his government's program to the new Parliament (see p. 34), he went out of his way to call for an end to Yugoslavia's isolation. Popovic was equally friendly:

"The success of the Polish people . . . is a joy for our people and we are convinced that the governments of our two countries will continue to maintain the established, fruitful cooperation and will further develop it in every respect to our mutual benefit and in the interest of strengthening peace."

Soviet Anniversaries

Two Soviet anniversaries were recently marked with varying degrees of observance in the Communist bloc countries—the first anniversary of the Twentieth CPSU Congress on February 13 and the thirty-ninth anniversary of the founding of the Red Army on February 22.

With the exception of the Poles, the Communist countries tended to ignore the condemnation of Stalin and Stalinism which had been the most striking feature of the Twentieth Soviet Congress. Instead, in apparent references to Poland, they condemned "petit bourgeois" ideas and lashed out at conspiracies to "revise" Marxism-Leninism. At the same time, they reiterated the concept of peaceful coexistence, but failed to stress the ideas of open parliamentary competition with other parties in the free countries and of coalitions with some of these parties in so-called "Popular Fronts." They replaced these tactical theoretical enunciations of the Congress with repeated reminders that the class struggle had not ceased and that its existence was at the root of all relations between Communists and non-Communists, as well as between the nations of the Soviet bloc and the rest of the world.

This general line as decreed by Moscow was reflected in comments in Czechoslovak, Romanian and Bulgarian papers. The Hungarian regime apparently ignored the occasion, probably because it recognized that the Twentieth Congress played an important part in the October Revolt and symbolized policies opposed to those now being implemented in the country. The Albanian regime, however, having consistently disregarded the Congress policies, used the occasion to praise Stalin (see p. 49).

The Polish press and radio, on the other hand, seized this opportunity to back the course steered by Gomulka since he assumed power. In so doing, the Poles refused to follow the current ideological somersault of re-deifying Stalin; on February 14 for instance, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), the Party paper, bluntly pointed to the "disastrous consequences of blindly imitating the Stalinist model." The same editorial also refused to emasculate the real meaning of the Twentieth Congress and re-emphasized that it had marked a sharp break with the past:

"Of all the Congresses since Lenin's death, the Twentieth Congress has gone down in the history of the CPSU and of the world Communist movement as one marked by the greatest wealth of ideas, by the most searching Marxist-Leninist analysis of events in the Soviet Union and in the international arena."

In deference to the concept of inter-bloc unity, *Trybuna Ludu* warned against "chauvinism" and the emergence of anti-Soviet sentiments, pointing out that such manifestations tend to undermine the security and independence of Poland.

Soviet Army Day

Observance by the bloc of Soviet Army Day was more uniform, with the Poles joining the other regimes in laying wreaths at Soviet memorials and holding receptions, concerts and other affairs in honor of the Red Army. These ceremonies were of particular significance this year in view of the part played by the Soviet armed forces in crushing the Hungarian Revolt. The Kadar regime therefore made a major issue of the "debt" owed by the East European people, and the Hungarians in particular, to the Soviet Army. The Soviet forces were described as the main agent of the people's liberation from "Fascism" and the protectors of "Socialism" against the schemes of Western imperialists.

Poland

Premier Addresses New Sejm

In a February 26 address to the newly-elected Sejm (Parliament), convened on February 20, Premier Cyrankiewicz placed maximum stress on the need for caution and discipline in the present period, indicating that one of his government's chief concerns was to prevent the forces unleashed during Poland's October Revolution from getting out of hand. Speaking in sober tones, Cyrankiewicz clearly implied that the Gomulka regime was in no position to make extravagant promises, that it would tolerate no demonstrations of "anarchy" and that there were distinct limits to liberalization both in the economic and political spheres.

The necessity for restraint received particular emphasis in the Premier's discussion of the national economy. In describing measures taken since the Eighth Plenum (October, 1956), he declared that the government had aimed at avoiding decisions which would lead to major disturbances. He pointed specifically to steps directed at decentralization and the development of "workers' democracy," but stated that care had been taken to preserve basic centralized control. Measures introduced since the Eighth Plenum, he said, "have met with the approval of public opinion, but we sometimes come across resistance in translating them into life; . . . even more frequently, we come across utterances about their inadequacy. The process of these changes is by no means completed and it ought to be said that this process should not be too rapid. Rash decisions confined to some sectors arbitrarily selected from the whole would no doubt be a mistake." (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], February 28.)

Cyrankiewicz then pointed out that while the government was considering plans to increase the autonomy of local industry, it strongly rejected "ideas aimed at the 'total liquidation of centralized planning.'" Such ideas, he said, were in contradiction to the "Socialist system" and would have an adverse effect on the living standard. The Premier used the same argument to reject proposals for placing enterprises, mines and factories in the hands of the workers. Worker self-government, he insisted, must be "reconciled with" centralized planning.

Workers' Councils Restricted

After describing the limits of "workers' democracy," Cyrankiewicz turned to the question of the workers' councils. Although he pledged Party support to these bodies, he made it clear that the councils would be stripped of much of the political power assumed in the October Revolution and that their role was not to control factories but to help in the implementation of plans. The Premier stated several times that "at present" the councils should function "within economic enterprises," where they should prevent waste, help make the best use of production capacity and improve productivity:

"In this way, the workers' councils, to which we all attach great importance, will contribute in the most efficient way to the acquiring of factory funds by the staff and at the same time to [increasing] savings for the entire community. . . .

"The government will be interested in the work done by the workers' councils and will extend them universal assistance by directing their main efforts to the *internal affairs of the enterprise*, to the struggle for bigger, better and cheaper output." (Italics added)

Cyrankiewicz also spoke on the need for discipline in various economic branches. He urged the workers' councils to prevent violations in wage regulations which, he said, damaged prospects for raising the living standard. "It must be said that in 1956 the discipline of payments was considerably shaken and bank control weakened. This contributed to an increase of unjustified payments amounting to two billion zloty."

The Premier spoke even more strongly about the "lack of discipline" in the countryside. He referred to serious delays in compulsory deliveries, particularly of cereals and livestock, and to decreases in tax payments. These tendencies, he declared, threatened the stability of food prices and the living standard of both workers and farmers. Cyrankiewicz also lashed out at "speculative elements" who were disrupting the State plan for purchase of agricultural products. He said that the government opposed the development of private trade in agriculture and that although concessions recently had been made to private retail trade in certain sectors, the aim was not to curtail "Socialized" trade. Private trade, he explained, "must amplify, help and develop, and not just represent a retreat from Socialist trade."

Prosperity Problematic

On the subject of the 1957 plan and the living standard, Cyrankiewicz maintained the same note of caution and was careful not to raise false hopes. He said that the quantity of goods earmarked for the home market is scheduled to rise by 16 percent in 1957, but he emphasized that the government was in no position to make new promises or to expand on its present decisions for the improvement of the popular welfare. Greater prosperity, he said, would depend upon the economic results attained this year.

Cyrankiewicz intimated that the success of the 1957 plan



"Democratization" is shown doing a tightrope act; underneath, Party and government leaders, including Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz, hold a net, ready to catch her; on the left, enemies of democratization, presumably the "Natolin" group, armed with pitchforks, eagerly await a slip-up.

Front cover of *Swiat* (Warsaw), December 16, 1956

would depend largely on the resolution of difficulties in foreign trade. Despite the recent agreement with the USSR, he said, Poland still suffered from a lack of foreign currency and recent reductions in Polish exports had complicated the situation. Referring to the reduction of 1957 coal exports by 6.5 million tons, he said: "Coal is fetching a good price today . . . on the market. It must be said [however] that the reduction in coal exports is not compensated by the increased price we are receiving for this commodity." To offset reductions in coal exports, the Premier called for serious efforts in the export of smelting and machinery products which, he said, should show a two-thirds increase over 1955 exports. As for imports, Cyrankiewicz concluded: "It may be assumed both on the basis of the November agreement [with the USSR] as well as on the basis of other trade negotiations now in progress, that our minimum import needs can be satisfied and that imports will not endanger our economic plan this year."

Towards the end of his speech, Cyrankiewicz dealt with matters pertaining to domestic politics. Contrary to ex-

pectations, the list of the new government which he submitted to the Sejm for approval contained no far-reaching changes. Cyrankiewicz was again named as Premier and Stefan Ignar, Piotr Jaroszewicz and Zenon Nowak, the last, the leader of the "Natolin" or "Stalinist" faction during the October upheaval, were retained as Deputy Premiers. The lack of any broad ministerial shakeup and the retention of the same men in many top posts indicated that pressure is being brought to bear on Gomulka by elements within his own Party and by Moscow to avoid dangerous "liberalizing" extremes.

Ministry Mergers

Although no major personnel changes were made, Cyrankiewicz repeatedly insisted that his government was proceeding steadily along the lines established at the Eighth Plenum. He discussed, for example, further proposed slashes in the administration and the merger of the following ministries: Power with Mining, the Machine Industry with Foundries, Building with Building Materials, Purchases with Foodstuffs and the Road and Air Ministries with the Ministry for Railways. The Premier also spoke about fighting anti-Semitism, increasing "peasant self-government" and the independence of the people's councils, and about "doing everything to preserve the atmosphere of sincerity and openness in political life."

In the field of foreign policy, Cyrankiewicz hewed to the line of "national independence" and close friendship with Moscow. Referring to the fact that no Western government had recognized the "historic fact" of the Oder-Neisse frontier, he said: "In these conditions, we are becoming all the more aware of the fundamental importance to us, to our national existence, of the alliance with the camp of Socialism, primarily with the Soviet Union. The unity of Socialist countries, close ties and friendship with the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic and all countries of our camp, is and will remain the basic condition for the security of our country."

While reaffirming Poland's alliance with the "Socialist camp," Cyrankiewicz also asserted the principle of friendship with Yugoslavia, despite the recent dispute between that country and the USSR. "Our relations with the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia," Cyrankiewicz said, "have been completely normalized in the past twelve months. . . . Today they are friendly. . . . We want to continue to develop [this friendship]. . . . We also welcome . . . every new step on the road toward overcoming the effects of Yugoslavia's harmful isolation from other Socialist States in the past."

Sejm Debates

During its first week in session, the Sejm elected a new State Council and a Sejm Presidium, approved the new government list submitted by Cyrankiewicz and dwelt at length on various aspects of his report. Abstentions in voting, votes in opposition (including one against Cyrankiewicz), and criticisms of the government's program gave evidence of revived Parliamentary activity, but on

the whole a cautious attitude was evident among the new Deputies and the sitting did not produce any startling results.

In calling the new Sejm to order, Senior Deputy Boleslaw Drobner, who took an active part in previous Sejm debates on the need for liberalization, urged that the Sejm "no longer remain dumb as it was until March 1955. . . . This Sejm must not be a Parliamentary fiction, it must become a source of renovation. It must and shall be a furnace in which we will be forging iron and steel as long as our October remains hot." (Radio Warsaw, February 20.) After Drobner's inaugural address, the Sejm unanimously elected Czeslaw Wycech (United Peasant Party) to the post of Speaker, or Marshal. Zenon Kliszko (United Workers' [Communist] Party) and Jerzy Jodlowski (Democratic Party) were elected as Deputy Speakers, so that all three Polish parties were represented in the Sejm Presidium. The Sejm then proceeded to elect the new State Council (see box, p. 40).

The Sejm debates got underway on February 27, the day after Premier Cyrankiewicz' report. The first to comment on the Premier's address was Deputy Speaker Kliszko, who announced his full approval of the new government and its program. Speaking in a more direct manner than the Premier, Kliszko stressed that the Eighth Plenum in no way signified a "turn away from the path . . . of Socialism" and that "it would be a naive mistake to see in the proclaimed and implemented freedom of private economic activity . . . any kind of revival of capitalism." (Radio Warsaw, February 27.) Kliszko was particularly adamant on the subject of agriculture:

"Agriculture is at present one of the main sectors on which our Party is focussing its attention. Agricultural problems are not [only] economic. They also constitute a basic political problem of the whole period of social construction, a problem of correct mutual relations between two fundamental classes of our society. . . . We shall fight for the Socialist direction of the changes in the countryside. We shall always support the development of collectives. We shall support the fight for such changes as will be recognized and accepted as their own by the peasants. . . [and which are not barriers] to increased production but, on the contrary . . . means of contributing to its steady growth."

Criticism and Dissatisfaction

In contrast to Kliszko, various non-party speakers voiced reservations about the new program. One Deputy, Antoni Wojtysiak (unaffiliated), declared that he intended to vote against the new government list and that the program submitted to the Sejm was deficient in many respects. Wojtysiak objected to the fact that the government had ignored such problems as unemployment (particularly among young people without adequate education), the supply of foodstuffs to an ever-growing population, and construction. He also criticized the program for agriculture, stating that it consisted of half-measures. (Western sources also quoted Wojtysiak as saying that he lacked confidence in Cyrankiewicz because he had held a top post in the Stalinist period.)

Two other non-party Deputies, Stanislaw Stomma and Jerzy Bukowski, expressed dissatisfaction with the choice of certain ministers although they endorsed the government list. Stomma said that the community had expected more significant changes in leadership and Bukowski declared that the choice of Franciszek Waniolka as Minister of Mining was an "unhappy one" because he had been responsible for the breakdown of the coal extraction plan. He also objected to the choice of Ryszard Strzelecki as Minister of Railways, Road and Air Transport, because as Railway Minister he had given no guarantees that he would eliminate the "neglect" prevailing in this field.

A Deputy from the Democratic Party, Jan Wende, expressed regret that Cyrankiewicz had not discussed matters pertaining to culture, science and art, and urged action in these fields in the near future. Wende also spoke up for the necessity of private ownership on a small scale and stated that "we consider it a matter of great urgency today to regulate . . . property relations in Poland with recognition of the necessity of the existence of small [private] property in towns and villages." On the subject of foreign policy, Wende voiced the following sentiments:

"We believe that our political thought is capable of new



"Within the framework of coexistence." Sign on church reads: "Because of the conference of the Basic Party Organization, the meeting of the Rosary Fraternity was postponed."

Szpilki (Warsaw), February 10, 1957



Picture of a school built with the help of money sent by Americans of Polish descent. Until recently it was not admitted that such help had been given. The caption to the picture reads: "Surely no town need be ashamed of such a school. It is large and roomy." The article of which this picture was a component part explains: "After the VIIIth Plenum, the inhabitants of Jadowniki started to dig out the records on the school, which had been hidden underground. Letters were brought from various hiding places. In one of them, I found the following: . . . in the same way we, living here [in Chicago], take care of Jadowniki, while others take care of places where they once lived. Not long ago, I saw a photograph of a church built with our help . . ."

Swiat (Warsaw), February 3, 1957

ideas in foreign policy. We must consistently strive to achieve harmony between our already traditional relations with Socialist countries . . . and our new contacts . . . with all those countries which, regardless of their political systems, are prepared to carry on multilateral economic, political and cultural collaboration with us on the basis of independence and . . . peace." (*Trybuna Ludu*, February 28)

Parliamentary Clubs

A significant innovation in the new Sejm was the formation of Parliamentary clubs organized on a political basis. Previously, Sejm Deputies were organized only in territorial groups. Before the Sejm opened on February 20, three clubs were formed for members of the three Polish political parties. A fourth club, headed by Deputy Stomma (an editor on the Catholic publication *Tygodnik Powszechny*), was also planned for Catholic Deputies.

Unofficial reports from Warsaw stated that strong opposition to the retention of "Natolinists" in the government was voiced at a meeting of the Communist Parliamentary Club on the day before the Sejm opened. It was claimed that the economist Oscar Lange and the editor of *Poprostu* E. Lasota had stated that the choice of Zenon Nowak as Vice-Premier was a betrayal of the October Revolution. Senior Deputy Drobner allegedly concurred. Gomulka, who was also present at the meeting, was reported to have declared that Nowak's role in the past was unimportant

since he now supported the decisions of the Eighth Plenum. Gomulka then went on to attack "bourgeois elements" in the Party as well as "revisionists," intellectuals and various political writers, whom he called "scribes."

1956 Plan Results

According to data published in *Trybuna Ludu*, February 19, the Polish national income in 1956 amounted to 254 billion *zloty*. This figure is reportedly 7 percent higher than that of 1955 and 2 percent over the 1956 plan. Industrial production rose 9.9 percent over 1955, fulfilling the plan by 102.7 percent.

Agricultural production increased 6 percent over that of 1955, it was stated, overfulfilling the plan by 1 percent. The area under cultivation remained at the 1955 figure, 15.4 million hectares. There was a considerable increase in the cattle and hog population, the former being 8.35 million head, the latter 11.56 million head, increases of approximately 6 percent. The sheep population declined slightly to 4.22 million head. Total income of the rural population, it was stated, increased by 7.5 billion *zloty*, over 18 percent.

The report gave little information on the collapse of agricultural collectivization. It stated only that the number of kolkhozes had declined by 75 percent during the year, and that of the remainder an unspecified number were reorganized, presumably into simpler forms of collectivization or true cooperatives.

In general, the national investment level of 1955 was maintained. Gross investment in the national economy amounted to 50.4 billion *zloty*, fulfilling only 92 percent of the investment plan. Net investment amounted to 36.8 billion *zloty* and the net share of investment in the national income dropped from just under 16 percent in 1955 to 14.5 percent.

Government encouragement of small, independent businesses was reflected in an 8 percent increase in investments in the private sector of the economy. These investments totaled 3.4 billion *zloty* last year, including 760 million *zloty* in State credits for private enterprises, 68 percent more than in 1955.

The "share of consumption" in the national income rose from 77 percent in 1955 to 79 percent. The overall sum of wage increases amounted to 9.3 billion *zloty* and the wage fund was 17 percent greater than in 1955. (In the February 15 issue of *Trybuna Ludu*, the wage fund was said to have increased 15 billion *zloty* in 1956, from 92 billion *zloty* to 107 billion.)

In housing, a total of 239,900 new rooms were made available for dwellings in 1956, a 4.8 percent decrease in comparison with 1955. About 20,000 rooms, planned but uncompleted in 1956, have been added to the 1957 plan, with instructions that they be finished in the first quarter of this year. 1.7 billion *zloty* were spent for capital repairs on apartment dwellings last year, 15.8 percent more than in 1955.

The plan for exports was fulfilled by only 95 percent, with deficiencies in the amount of coal, coke, zinc and sugar sent out of the country. The import plan was ful-



"Two statesmen, Chou En-lai and Wladyslaw Gomulka, both of whom enjoy the trust of their nations. Pictures taken at the reception given in honor of the Chinese guests."

Front cover of *Swiat* (Warsaw), January 20, 1957

filled by only 97 percent, but there was an above-plan import of consumer goods "necessary to maintain the equilibrium between the increase in purchasing power of the population and the quantity of goods on the domestic market."

Specific figures for industrial production were given as follows (with percentages over or below the plan in parentheses): electric power, 19,491,300,000 kilowatt hours (.2); pig iron, 3,506,200 tons (4.5); crude steel, 5,014,300 tons (2.9); rolled goods, 3,307,500 tons (2); cement, 4,035,100 tons (0); coal, 95,148,900 tons (-.9); iron ore, 1,644,400 tons (-6); metal-working machine tools, 28,680 tons (-20).

Press Changes

The current Polish attempts to curb the most far-reaching expressions of liberalization were reflected in a change in editorship of Warsaw's *Trybuna Ludu*, the leading Party daily. Radio Warsaw, March 6, announced that editor-in-chief Wladyslaw Matwin had been replaced by Leon Kasman. Matwin had assumed the post in November, at the height of the post-Eighth Plenum ferment. He has now also been relieved of his post as Secretary of the Party Central Committee, and been transferred to First Secretary of

the Wroclaw Province Party Committee. His successor, Kasman, edited *Trybuna Ludu* from 1949 to 1954, through the darkest days of Polish Stalinism.

According to unofficial reports, the change in editorship was preceded by severe criticism of the newspaper from Party leaders, including Gomulka. The First Party Secretary, it was reported, accused the newspaper's staff of partiality in criticizing "Stalinist" tendencies but not criticizing liberalizing "excesses." Further reports stated that eight members of the newspaper's staff, including several prominent journalists, resigned in protest at the removal of Matwin.

Despite this indication of regime control, the efflorescence of the Polish press continued to manifest itself in the publication of a number of new or previously suppressed periodicals. Among these are: *Tygodnik Powszechny*, a Catholic publication suppressed in 1953; *Dziennik Ludowy*, representing the United Peasants' Party; *Tygodnik Zachodni*, a Poznan paper said to have a policy similar to that of Warsaw's liberal weekly *Poprostu*; and a comic weekly for boys, *Przygoda*. In addition, the weekly *Kraj*, organ of the repatriation drive aimed at Poles abroad, has been abolished; it has been replaced by a journal called *7 Dni w Polsce*.

National Minorities

The Party has taken steps to curb the wave of hatred toward Jews and other minorities that has in recent months burst out in Poland (see March issue, page 6), and is now driving many of Poland's remaining Jews to emigrate. The Party Central Committee established a committee on national minority problems, [*Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), February 22.] to be headed by Witold Jarosinski, Warsaw Party Committee First Secretary. The new group will encourage national minorities to cultivate their own national cultures and languages. It will also work to remove "still existing mutual distrust and antipathy which sometimes affect Party organizations," concentrating on problems affecting Jews, Germans and Ukrainians.

On March 1, Radio Warsaw reported that the Szczecin Province Party Committee had also established a minorities committee, designed to deal with problems of Germans, Greeks, Macedonians and other minorities in its area. At the opening meeting of the group, demands were made that severe penalties be imposed on those guilty of crimes directed against citizens of non-Polish birth.

Radio Warsaw announced on February 21 that Jozef Kłodnicki and Stanislaw Musial were given suspended six and three month sentences, respectively, by a Wroclaw court, for shouting anti-German and anti-Semitic abuse in public. The prosecutor's office has demanded a retrial on the grounds that more severe, unsuspended sentences were warranted by the crime.

Independent Business Enterprises

Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw) reported on January 26 that a joint stock company for ship construction has been formed at the initiative of workers at the Szczecin Repair Shipyard. On March 5, Radio Warsaw announced that legal provisions for the corporation will be considered by Parliament and probably will be incorporated in the new law for the development of the maritime fleet. Whether the corporate form of business would be limited to shipbuilding was not disclosed.

The company, as now planned, will be a voluntary association of Poles "living at home or abroad" who would acquire shares for 500 *zloty* or ten dollars each, with no individual permitted to own more than ten shares. The initiators of the corporation are said to be seeking a fund of at least one billion *zloty* for the construction of ships with a total tonnage of 120,000 deadweight tons. Orders have already been placed with the Szczecin Shipyard and two ships reportedly will be ready for use this year.

The government will provide 20 percent of the capital and will own an equivalent amount of stock. More than one thousand people are said to have already offered to buy shares worth two million *zloty*. Groups of shareholders have appeared in Wroclaw, Cracow, Katowice as well as in Szczecin. The corporation will pay dividends, but shares will bear the names of their owners "to prevent acquisition by speculators."

Slowo Powszechnie (Warsaw), February 8, stated that 8,000 new artisan workshops had opened during the last

months, and that the number of privately owned retail shops increased during the fourth-quarter of 1956 by 42 percent, from 11,905 to 16,917. In the same period, the number of privately-owned food catering establishments increased from 265 to 863.

Rural Youth Union

The February 10 National Conference of the ZMW (Union of Rural Youth) was the scene of attempts by sections of the rank and file to identify the organization with the prewar *Wici*, an independent organization closely associated with the prewar Peasant Party. The leadership of the ZMW fought off attempts to rename the organization *Wici*, but a new weekly published by the Union bears that name. The editorial of the first issue warned, however, that this did not mean a rebirth of "agrarianism" or "rightest maneuvers," *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), February 11, reported.

The declaration of the ZMW read: "We are an organized, ideological and educational political movement of rural youth." The group considers its function to be:

"...the creation of the best conditions for the development of agricultural production, particularly on individual farms which are now the biggest suppliers of food and agricultural raw materials. The Union will encourage farmers to introduce collective forms of farming, provided that conditions in a given area are ripe for the process and on the understanding that the only motive for joining a collective farm will be the personal conviction of the farmer that collective farming is superior to individual farming."

The declaration stated that the Union will "strengthen the worker-peasant alliance" while "recognizing the leading role" of the Communist Party. It will be organizationally independent of both the Communist Party and the fellow-travelling United Peasant Party.

MTS Changes

The widespread changes in the character of Polish agriculture are affecting MTS. Radio Warsaw, February 8, announced that "several score" MTS, mainly in the Western Territories, are to become economically independent April 1. The announcement said the gradual economic independence of all MTS in the country is also being contemplated.

According to the plan, the State will eventually cease subsidizing the stations. At the same time, an increase in service costs will be prohibited. The MTS are expected to work at a profit once better organization is introduced simultaneously with a reduction in administrative apparatus and abolition of political departments.

A uniform price will be established for MTS services for all independent farms, regardless of size. Under the previous arrangement, larger private farms had to pay more than smaller. The government statement said: "This will enable many farms ruined by the erroneous policy of past years to overcome the difficulties in cultivating their land."

Border Negotiations

Trybuna Ludu reported on March 6 that Polish-Soviet talks on the final establishment of the mutual frontier in the territory adjoining the Baltic Sea have concluded in agreement. The negotiations, which took place in February and March, did not result in a final demarcation, but that is apparently considered only a technicality.

A March 6 announcement by Radio Warsaw said that no serious changes are envisaged in the existing border line, adding that the importance of negotiations is that they stop "speculation in some circles in the West . . . on the subject of the alleged intentions of the Soviet Union to withdraw its support for Polish rights to its previous territory in the West and in the North." The announcement added:

"Unfortunately, no Western government . . . has yet taken a definite, positive position in the matter of our boundaries, although public opinion in the West leans increasingly towards our position that the Oder-Neisse boundary [with Germany] is definite and irrevocable."

Travel, Communications Revisions

The Polish government has taken steps to relax its system of frontier guards. According to Radio Warsaw, February 18, in relaxing border controls Polish authorities will shorten train frontier formalities and will no longer post frontier guards on Polish ships. Furthermore, crews of foreign ships will now be able to come ashore in Poland without hindrance. Previously-restricted border roads reportedly will be open to tourists.

Communication outside Poland, however, has recently become more expensive as a result of the February limited devaluation of the *zloty* in comparison with Western and Yugoslav currencies. This means that all foreign postal, telephone and telegraph services will increase six times in cost. This affects the ruble area as well, because, according to international convention, payment for communications is made by Poland to all countries in gold Swiss francs, for which the new exchange rate has been fixed.

The government stated that transportation prices for travel to countries in the ruble area will remain unchanged. The cost of surface transportation to the West increased six-fold beyond ruble area borders. Air travel prices to points outside the ruble area increased six-fold from the point of origin.

Hungary

Reorganizations

Reorganization of the government, the economy, the army and the Party highlight continued attempts by the Kadar regime to buttress its authority in Hungary. These efforts are taking place in a setting of arrests and trials of Hungarians accused of taking part in last fall's uprising and of continued resistance to the regime. They follow the squelching of workers and recalcitrant intellectuals (see March issue, pp. 33-40).

New economies in administration have limited the size and structure of Kadar's government. At present, only nine branches of the administration are headed by ministers, as compared to 23 before October. The latest reshuffling, announced in *Nepszabadsag* on March 1, names Ferenc Munnich First Deputy Premier; Frigyes Doleschall, Minister of Public Health; Bela Biszku, Minister of the Interior; Gyula Kallai, Minister of Public Education; and Geza Revesz, Minister of National Defense. Sandor Ronai was relieved of duty as Minister of Trade but remains as Speaker of the parliament. Retaining their portfolios are: Gyorgy Marosan, Minister of State; Istvan Kossa, Minister of Finance; Imre Horvath, Foreign Minister; Antal Apro, Minister of Industry; and Imre Dogei, Minister of Agriculture.

In addition to the ministerial changes, policy revisions were introduced in a number of ministries. These revisions affected the Ministries of Industry and Agriculture, as well as the Price Office. In industry, the emphasis was placed on decentralization as a means of streamlining and boosting production. Three separate sections were set up within the ministry to handle mining, electric power and chemical industries, respectively. According to a ministry official (Radio Budapest, February 12) the new arrangements will result in a 50 percent reduction in the administrative staff of the ministry and will entail greater freedom for enterprises and trusts.

Meanwhile, 4,000 of the 32,000 employees at the rebel-

Polish Council of State

On February 20, the first day of the session, the new Polish Parliament elected from among its members a new Council of State; this body is officially head of State. The listing below gives party affiliation and the pattern of the vote for each member of the Council. Abstentions and negative votes in a Communist-controlled Parliament are, of course, almost unprecedented.

- A Zawadzki, president (PZPR)—elected unanimously
- J. Albrecht, vice-president (PZPR)—elected unanimously
- S. Kulczynski, vice-president (SD)—elected unanimously
- O. Lange, vice-president (PZPR)—elected unanimously
- K. Banach (ZSL)—elected unanimously
- W. Gomulka (PZPR)—elected unanimously
- I. Loga-Sowinski (PZPR)—elected unanimously
- B. Podedworny, vice-president (ZSL)—one abstention
- L. Chajn (SD)—one abstention
- J. Horodecki, secretary (ZSL)—two abstentions
- A. Musialowa (PZPR)—six abstentions
- J. Zawieyski (non-party Catholic)—seven abstentions
- R. Nowak (PZPR)—one vote against, seven abstentions
- J. Ozga-Michalski (ZSL)—two votes against
- L. Kruczowski (PZPR)—four votes against, seven abstentions.

New Polish Government

Following is the composition of the Polish government as confirmed by the Parliament on February 27. PZPR—United Workers' [Communist] Party. ZSL—United Peasant Party. SD—Democratic Party.

Premier	Jozef Cyrankiewicz	PZPR	Small-Scale Industry and Handicrafts	Zygmunt Moskwa	SD
Deputy Premiers	Zenon Nowak Piotr Jaroszewicz Stefan Ignar	PZPR PZPR ZSL	Forestry and Timber Agriculture Railways, Roads and Air Transport Shipping Communications Domestic Trade Foreign Trade Higher Education Education Art and Culture Health Labor and Social Welfare Chairman of Planning Commission Minister without Portfolio, (Religious Affairs)	Jan Dab-Kociol Edward Ochab Ryszard Strzelecki Stanislaw Darski Jan Rabanowski Marian Minor Witold Trampczynski Stefan Zolkiewski Wladyslaw Bienkowski Karol Kuryluk Rajmund Baranski Stanislaw Zawadzki Stefan Jedrychowski Jerzy Sztachelski Jan Gorecki* Stanislaw Sroka*	ZSL PZPR Non-party SD PZPR PZPR PZPR PZPR PZPR PZPR PZPR PZPR PZPR PZPR PZPR PZPR
Ministers:					
National Defense	Marian Spychalski	PZPR			
Foreign Affairs	Adam Rapacki	PZPR			
Internal Affairs	Wladyslaw Wicha	PZPR			
Justice	Marian Rybicki	PZPR			
Finance	Tadeusz Dietrich	PZPR			
Coal Mining and Power	Franciszek Waniolka	PZPR			
Metallurgy and Engineering Industry	Kiejstut Zemajtis	PZPR			
Building and Building Materials	Stefan Pietrusiewicz	PZPR			
Chemical Industry	Antoni Radlinski	PZPR			
Light Industry	Eugeniusz Stawinski	PZPR			
Agricultural Purchasing and Foodstuffs	Feliks Pisula	ZSL			

* Deputy Minister acting as provisional head of Ministry pending its dissolution. Functions of Ministry will then be taken over by an independent agency.

lious Budapest Csepel Works have been fired. Of those dismissed, it was reported that 70 percent were pensioned off and the rest released in a cut of the administrative staff.

In the reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture, decentralization was intended to separate purely administrative functions from other tasks. Radio Budapest reported on February 11 that this ministry will also cut its administrative staff by 50 percent. The ministry has now been assigned the dual task of raising production and reforming disbanded collectives. According to the latest information peasants are apparently being herded back into the hated kolkhozes, a measure which is bound to affect production adversely. On March 2 *Nepszabadsag* said the reorganization of collectives since November had brought the number up to 2,349 as compared to the 3,954 before the uprising. (On January 8, the same newspaper reported that only 1,599 collective farms were still in existence.)

Apparently in an effort to counteract the effects of forced re-collectivization, the regime has adopted a conciliatory attitude toward farmers in other matters. Dogei thus announced that the government will not restore compulsory deliveries of farm produce, and further commented that:

"There will be no fixed compulsory sowing area either. The collectives and the individual farmers will be free to sow what they like and they can freely dispose of their produce. The Council of Ministers has decided that farm taxes will not be raised. The government wants to insure

the continued planned food supplies of the towns but the basis for this will be buying on the free market. To further these aims, the system of voluntary production contracts will be substantially enlarged." (Radio Budapest, February 24)

Another measure, this one designed to promote small private farming, is a decree promulgated (Radio Budapest, February 15) ostensibly to undo injustices done to peasants in the first big collectivization drive in the Stalinist era. While explicitly protecting collectives, the decree states:

"Working peasants who suffered damage during commassation, redistribution and other kinds of requisitioning after September 1, 1949 may claim compensation. Those working peasants whose main occupation is farming may claim State reserve lands, but only if the area is a plot, or part of a plot, not exceeding 35.5 acres."

In announcing the reorganization of the Price Office, the government indicated it would permit limited and controlled small, private enterprise. New measures, it is now promised, will make the expansion of private retail trade possible in fields where the "Socialist" retail trade has been found wanting and where needs of the population "warrant" it. An official of the internal trade organization said (Radio Budapest, February 16):

"The widening of the scope of private initiative is justi-

fied in places where it makes more goods available for trade, such as participation in the buying of certain agricultural products or the marketing of certain products of independent craftsmen. Private initiative is also justified in cases where it leads to reducing imports or increasing exports."

Rebuilding the Party

Confronted with continued opposition by an overwhelming majority of the Hungarian people, including the workers who formed the vanguard of the Revolt, the regime has been trying as best it can to rebuild its ranks, particularly outside of the larger towns, where its influence and control are still extremely weak. This drive has been made all the more difficult by the large-scale desertion of the most enterprising young Communists during the Revolt. The reconstituted Party has therefore had to depend to a large extent on opportunists, bureaucrats and Stalinist stalwarts. The latest program as enunciated at a Central Committee meeting (*Nepszabadsag*, February 28) appears to be an effort to harden the controlling organs at the top—no doubt to avoid the kind of disintegration that occurred in October—while enlarging the broad base of the Party with as many new members as care to join the hated organization.

Organizationally, the Central Committee reshuffled its membership, increasing it from 23 to 37, and re-established both a Secretariat and a Central Control Commission of five members each. Ideologically, the Central Committee stressed that criticism disguised as attacks on Stalinism and Rakosim must stop and that, instead, a firm line must be taken against "revisionist" tendencies: "Imre Nagy and his followers, with their anti-Marxist, revisionist, bourgeois-nationalist and anti-Soviet views, amounted to a negation of the proletarian dictatorship, causing ideological confusion among some workers and a paralysis of the forces of the Party and of Socialism." Despite this sweeping accusation against the former Premier and the popular ideas he stood for in the Party, the Kadar regime is trying to lure former Party members back into the fold:

"We cannot remain silent on the weakness of Party work. We resolutely condemn as harmful and sectarian the reserved attitude taken by certain Party members against intellectual workers. We also condemn the sectarian view that we do not need those who have not yet joined the Party. We must establish patient, comradely and friendly relations with those former members of the Hungarian Workers' Party who have not yet rejoined the Party."

Former members have been given until May 1 to rejoin the Party. At present, according to regime claims, membership is increasing at the rate of 8 to 12,000 a week; total membership was at the 200,000 mark on March 3. With the Party nucleus thus reconstituted, it has been promised that a Party Congress will be convened "within a few months" to formulate a broad program of action.

Army Reorganization

The openly anti-Soviet, often anti-Communist, stand of

the majority of officers and soldiers of the Hungarian armed forces during the revolt has also prompted the Kadar regime to make major changes in the army. On February 12, *Nepszabadsag* reported that Major General Laszlo Hegyi had been relieved as army chief-of-staff and replaced by Colonel Ferenc Ugrai. Major General Pal Ilku, head of the Political Department of the Ministry of National Defense, explained (*Nepszabadsag*, February 17) that henceforth the Party will play a greater role in shaping the political content of the new army. Political officers, he said, will have the rank of deputy commander and Party organizations will be formed in the ranks.

Steps are now being taken to fill those ranks. Draftees whose induction was prevented by last fall's events were instructed to report no later than March 10 and will be inducted in the spring.

Symptomatic of the government's suspicions concerning the efficacy of its army and police force in dealing with discontent was a February 18 decree disbanding previously formed workers' guards (proved unreliable in the uprising) and providing for the establishment of a new workers' militia. The decree read:

"In the interest of an increased defense of the Hungarian People's Republic and the people's democratic order, workers' guards (militia) must be organized. The task of the workers' guards is to assist the armed forces in defending the achievements of Socialism, insuring the calm of the working people and the smoothness of production and preventing attempts to restore counterrevolutionary elements. Members must be organized among workers loyal to Socialism and over 18 years of age and they are to be based on voluntary applications.

"Members of the workers' guards will carry out their task without remuneration and will be armed. They will be eligible for a refund of wages lost as a result of carrying out their duties. Members of the workers' guards must be regarded as officers of the law while performing their duties."

Continued Resistance

While the regime sought to develop a reliable military arm, it was also taking active measures to wipe out "counterrevolutionary" elements. In describing these latest measures, the regime admitted that scattered armed resistance still existed in Hungary:

"Often during the past few months counterrevolutionary elements did not shrink from shooting at our militia patrols at night. And even more widespread is the fact that criminals capable of anything, political gangsters and enemies of the people hid their weapons during the revolution, awaiting better opportunities." (*Nepszabadsag*, March 3)

A February 28 report of the paper said that "counterrevolutionaries in Szokolya are preparing to attack." On February 14, *Nepszabadsag* reported that a group of armed men in Veresegyhza were arrested, and asserted that "Fascists and kulaks still rule at Tomorkeny." Other areas were also described as places where rebels continue to flout the authorities.

The trial and sentencing of rebels remains a common oc-



Agró Antal



Biszku Béla



Fehér Lajos



Kádár János



Kállai Gyula



Kiss Károly



Marosán György



dr. Münnich Ferenc



Rónai Sándor



Somogyi Miklós

"The Executive Committee of the new Hungarian Socialist (Communist) Workers' Party." It seems to replace the old Politburo.
Nepszabadság (Budapest), February 28, 1957

currence in the country. Judges have been instructed to deal quickly and mercilessly with persons guilty of "counterrevolutionary crimes." To urge judges on to less traditional legal behavior, Deputy Premier Munnich said (Radio Budapest, February 16):

"We recognize the right of free appraisal, but we demand one thing: that judges should have the courage to apply the severity of the law against the enemy. A representative of the Supreme Court has rightly pointed out that we also combat the counterrevolution with weapons wielded by the judges."

This call for severity has apparently met with some success. Radio Budapest announced March 13 that by February 23, 40 persons had been sentenced to death by summary courts. An earlier report (*Nepszabadság*, February 16), said that summary courts had sentenced 156 persons to jail terms. This does not include those who were and are being punished without benefit of trial, nor does it include sentences handed down by regular criminal courts, for which no statistical information is available.

A new head of the prosecutor's office in Budapest has been appointed to reinforce the job of bringing anti-regime elements before the courts. *Nepszabadság* reported on February 2 that Janos Goetz was named to the post. Prosecutor-General Geza Szenasi used the occasion to announce:

"A prosecutor . . . can keep his post only as long as he is able to carry out a pitiless fight against the class enemy and the counterrevolution . . . according to the commission he received from the working people. It is all

right if the police make it clear to the Fascists, either summarily, or in the framework of the criminal procedure, possibly even on the streets, that it does not pay to oppose the authorities."

Despite their decrees, threats and measures, Communist authorities are aware that unrest and discontent in Hungary are far from being completely stifled. Police and army units were alerted (*Nepszabadság*, March 14) for anticipated unrest on March 15—the day on which Hungarians rose against their Austrian oppressors in 1848. But the day passed quietly, though tensely, despite the placarding of buildings in Budapest and other parts of the country with posters reading: "We Start Again in March" (*Nepszabadság*, March 3) and other calls to action. The Hungarian populace apparently realized that a March 15 uprising would have been mercilessly crushed by a regime prepared to meet it.

Student Unrest

A meeting of "several hundred directors of secondary schools" on February 28 discussed problems of student unrest, and admitted the necessity for police intervention in the schools, Radio Budapest, March 1, stated. A speaker blamed some of this unrest on the pre-Revolt regime:

" . . . even before October 23 [first day of the Revolt] a number of disquieting phenomena could be traced back to the crimes of the policy of the Rakosi-Gero clique, and the serious errors committed by this clique in the building of Socialism. There were real contradictions between what

was taught in the schools and what was experienced in the family circle, which led to serious moral and spiritual conflicts."

It was made clear, however, that manifestations of student dissatisfaction are to be treated as "provocations" and controlled by police action:

"It may therefore become necessary from time to time to take urgent and forceful measures when the school director finds that the life, peace and order of the school are threatened by internal or external provocation. It is this which makes it necessary for members of police formations to appear from time to time in our schools."

Compulsory Russian

Despite student demands, dating from before the Revolt, for the abolition of compulsory Russian courses in the school system, and despite post-Revolt promises that these would be abolished (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], January 4), it now appears that Russian is to continue to be a compulsory subject. *Nepszabadsag*, March 2, stated that Russian will be compulsory in all elementary schools. Other languages will be optional, it was stated, but severe shortages of teachers for these languages will limit the courses available.

In secondary schools, and, presumably, universities, Russian will apparently not be compulsory. It will be given administrative preference, however, and the shortage of teachers for other languages will also operate in its favor.

Bulgaria

Agreements with Soviets

A visit of Bulgarian Party and government leaders to Moscow in mid-February resulted in a series of declarations and agreements, one of which may foreshadow some reorganization of Bulgarian agriculture. The visit of the Bulgarians to Moscow followed that of other leaders of the bloc and, like these previous political pilgrimages, was clearly part of the current Soviet attempt to re-unite the various parts of the European Empire in the wake of last year's disruptive upheavals. The tenor of the meetings was set by repeated references to a maxim of the late Bulgarian Communist Georgi Dimitrov: "Friendship between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria is as necessary as the sun and air are for every living creature."

Among the Bulgarian leaders in the delegation were Premier Anton Yugov, First Party Secretary Todor Zhivkov, First Deputy Premiers Georgi Chankov and Georgi Traikov and Foreign Minister Karlo Lukanov. Also with the group was Deputy Premier Vulko Chervenkov, who made his first official appearance on behalf of the government since his removal from the Premiership last April in a limited and short-lived purge of Stalinists. Among the Soviet leaders with whom the Bulgarians met were Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoyan and Gromyko.

The meetings produced resolutions (*Rabotnicheskoe Delo*, [Sofia], February 21) reaffirming Soviet policy with regard



Manager of the shoe-factory: "Why do they complain that our shoes have to be resoled so soon. Mine are hardly worn."

Picture and caption from *Bulgaria Today* (Sofia), January 1957

to the Warsaw Pact, the Middle East, disarmament and "proletarian internationalism." The conferees also issued a statement on the Hungarian insurrection which defended Soviet intervention in that country:

"[Both governments] are unanimous in the belief that the counterrevolutionary rising in Hungary was provoked by imperialist aggressive circles and internal reactionary elements which undertook attacks against the people's democratic regime in Hungary with a view to reestablishing the power of big landowners and to transforming Hungary into a *place d'armes* for aggression against the countries of the Socialist camp. The intrigues of imperialism were directed toward the undermining of the unity of the Socialist countries and, at the same time, at hindering the successful building of Socialism in those countries.

"Both countries note with satisfaction that the Hungarian working people, under the leadership of the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government, with the fraternal aid of the Soviet Union and of the other Socialist countries, know how to defeat the counterrevolutionary forces and to defend their Socialist achievements. . . . The Soviet Union, having given military assistance at the request of the Hungarian government, has worthily fulfilled its international duty to the Hungarian people and to the peoples of other Socialist countries."

Revisionists Condemned

The two-government resolution made a passing reference to the desirability of further strengthening relations with Yugoslavia, and also called for the establishment of better relations with Greece and Turkey. Greater weight, however, was given to a denunciation of "all kinds of opportunist revisionists," that is, the Yugoslavs and their sympathizers within the bloc. The resolution specifically attacked those who were said to call themselves Marxist-Leninists while actually wanting to revise Marxism-Leninism "in order to please traitors to the working class and suit imperialists."

The resolution by the Parties of the two countries stated:

"International reaction has become convinced of the impossibility of undermining or of weakening the position of the Socialist countries when they act in close accord and is now making attempts to shake that unity, which is the true guarantee of their independence and sovereignty. With this aim in view, the bourgeoisie and its agents are seeking in every way to inflame nationalist feelings, to cause peoples to quarrel among themselves, to sow strife between the Communist Parties and to set them against each other. . . .

"At present, when international reaction has developed a violent campaign against Communism, striving to cast a slur on and discredit the ideas and principles of Marxism-Leninism—sacred to every true revolutionary—the CPSU and the Bulgarian Communist Party declare their unwavering loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism, their firm determination to fight against any attempts to revise Marxism-Leninism, against any wavering and deviation from it, against attempts to introduce ideological disorder in the ranks of the international revolutionary movement."

Economic Accord

The economic agreement signed by the two governments could bind Bulgaria to the Soviet Union even tighter than before. Bulgaria agreed to send the Soviet Union non-ferrous metal ores (including uranium), ships, tobacco, and increased shipments of fresh fruit, grapes and vegetables. In return, the USSR will ship Bulgaria metals, pig iron, rubber, oil products and, particularly, grain.

If the provisions of this agreement are fulfilled, Bulgaria, a traditionally agricultural land, might become dependent upon the Soviet Union for its supply of grain. The emphasis placed on increased production and export of Bulgarian fruit and vegetables was noted in speeches made by returning Bulgarian leaders. *Rabotnichesk Delo* on February 26 reported a speech by Georgi Traikov, leader of the Agrarian Union faction in the government, in which he said: "We Bulgarians are known as masters of agriculture, viticulture, fruit growing and tobacco production and there is no doubt that with our experience and our determination to progress we shall turn Bulgaria into a fruitful and beautiful garden."

Long-Term Credits

In another section of the agreement, the Soviet Union offered Bulgaria long-term credits of 200 million rubles for industrial purposes. This amounts to less than two percent of the Bulgarian budget. Most of the money is to be spent for the partial construction of a nitrogen fertilizer factory and an adjoining coal concentration factory, a lead and zinc works with a planned annual capacity of 30,000 tons of lead and 40,000 tons of zinc, a coke chemical plant with an annual capacity of 300,000 tons and a coal concentration factory with an annual capacity of 1,000,000 tons.

Another part of the agreement calls for a contract for the building and repair of Soviet ships by Bulgaria during the 1958-1960 period. Representatives were also said to be

working out measures to insure employment in the Bulgarian shipbuilding industry for a longer period of time.

Czechoslovakia

1956 Plan Fulfillment

The Czechoslovak economy is faced with serious bottlenecks in basic industries, according to the State Statistical Office's annual report on plan fulfillment (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], February 12). While claiming that national income increased in 1956 by 6 percent, consumption by 7 percent and industrial production by 9.5 percent, the report revealed that one-fifth of the industrial plants did not fulfill their output plans and that total investment in new capacity was less than had been planned. Serious shortages occurred in the production of coal, steel and certain engineering items. There was excessive consumption of raw materials, and while labor productivity rose by nearly 7 percent—slightly more than planned—the report criticized a tendency of wages to rise too fast. The construction industry did not fulfill its plan, and the number of new apartments built was less than in 1955. In agriculture, grain crops and livestock production were substantially above the 1948-1955 average, but the harvest of sugar beets and fodder root plants substantially below it.

While the economy showed definite signs of strain in fulfilling the Plan, production in most sectors was above the level of 1955. The output figures given by the report were as follows, with percentage increases over (or, if minus, decreases from) 1955 in parentheses: hard coal, 23.4 million tons (6); brown coal, 44 million tons (14); lignite, 2.2 million tons (7); coke, 7.3 million tons (5); electric power, 16.6 billion kwh (10.5); iron ore, 2.1 million tons (8); pig iron, 3.3 million tons (10); steel, 4.9 million tons (9); rolled products, 3.3 million tons (10); aluminum, 21,200 tons (-14); sulfuric acid, 422,000 tons (10); nitrogenous fertilizers, 64,000 tons (7); phosphorous fertilizers, 107,000 tons (9); synthetic fibers, 49,000 tons (1); truck tires, 636,000 (12); passenger car tires, 329,000 (45); diesel engines, 15,894 (52); diesel locomotives, 231 (7); electric locomotives, 105 (100); conventional machine tools, 19,020 (3); automatic and semi-automatic machine tools, 478 (68); trucks, 11,046 (5); cars, 25,068 (100); tractors, 18,004 (43); roller bearings, 17,963,000 (26); freight cars, 5,898 (6); railway coaches, 377 (204); buses, 1,215 (9); motorcycles, 111,000 (17); motor scooters, 30,459 (757); vacuum cleaners, 161,688 (33); cameras, 163,759 (12); television sets, 40,078 (132); refrigerators, 58,141 (90); washing machines, 253,502 (23); electric stoves, 16,707 (45); cement, 3,148,000 (9); lime, 1,679,000 (9); bricks, 1,827 million (10); unbleached cellulose, 320,000 tons (2); paper, 360,000 tons (4); leather footwear, 21,766,000 pairs (-4); cotton textiles, 349,755,000 meters (2); woolen textiles, 36,777,000 meters (-7); silk textiles, 49,758,000 meters (-2); flaxen and semiflaxen textiles, 51,746,000 meters (-6); knitted underwear, 29,491,000 pieces (-10); knitwear, 32,747,000 (5).

In agriculture advances were claimed in total crop area

and in grain yields, as well as in mechanization and the use of fertilizers. Grain production was 11 percent above the 1948-1955 average, and potatoes 27 percent; on the other hand, sugar beets were down 16 percent and fodder root plants 17 percent. The number of cattle reached 4,220,000 head and of hogs 5,847,000, increases of 66,000 and 34,000 over 1955. Collectivization was reported to have advanced in 1956: the number of collective farms (types III and IV) increased from 6,795 at the end of 1955 to 8,016 at the end of last year, and their membership from 329,000 to 395,000. They now farm more than 2.2 million hectares or 39 percent of Czechoslovakia's arable land.

Shortcomings

In commenting on the plan results *Rude Pravo* said on February 13 that "the whole national economy was greatly hampered by such important sectors as the engineering, iron and steel and coal mining industries."

"The failure of the engineering industry to deliver the planned and necessary equipment for capital construction, such as steam boilers, machine tools, transformers, cranes, pumps and so forth, makes it difficult to build industrial plants and particularly to put them into operation. The engineering industry, and particularly heavy engineering, did not fulfill foreign trade commitments last year. These warning facts . . . indicate the possibility of new disproportions in our economy which must be prevented."

Coal Crisis

The effects of a sharp decrease in coal deliveries from Poland, compounded by the perennial and growing inadequacy of Czechoslovak domestic coal production, has created major economic difficulties in the country. Party and government leaders have reacted to this crisis with new exhortations in extensive tours of the coal regions.

Minister of the Interior Rudolf Barak visited the Rosice mines February 6; on February 8, Premier Viliam Siroky spoke to the miners at Ostrava, President Antonin Zapotocky to those at Rtyne, Speaker of the National Assembly Zdenek Fierlinger was at Kladno and Party Central Committee Secretary Jiri Hendrych at Zbuh; Deputy Premier Vaclav Kopecky spoke to the miners at Hodonin on February 10; Slovak Commissioner Stefan Kremlarik was at Handlova the same day; and First Party Secretary Antonin Novotny spoke at Most on February 11.

The government also met to discuss the problem on February 13. In addition to plans designed to help lagging pits, it approved measures aimed at "increasing manpower in the Ostrava and Kladno coal basins as soon as possible" (Radio Prague, February 14).

At Ostrava, Siroky admitted to the miners that the previously reported revision of the 1957 production plan was partly dictated by the coal shortage. He said the main reason for the inadequate production of coal was "backwardness in mechanization." In addition, the value of special Sunday shifts at Ostrava and other major mining regions was said (Radio Bratislava, February 14) to be negated by absenteeism "the incidence of which is worse than was anticipated."

Rude Pravo declared on March 3 that despite special deliveries of coal from the USSR, it will be necessary to make further switches from hard to soft coal and increasingly to utilize inferior quality fuels.

Party Demands More Industrial Efficiency


Economic problems were surveyed by the Party Central Committee in a meeting at the end of February. In a resolution entitled "For Greater Efficiency in the Czechoslovak Economy" (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], March 2), the CC pointed out that shortages of fuel, power and raw materials which have hampered economic growth in recent years were not overcome in 1956. Production costs were still too high; labor productivity lagged; some important building projects were not completed; engineering deliveries were slow; and farm production did not fulfill its plan. These difficulties were aggravated by "some external factors"—presumably the events in Poland and Hungary—with the result that "a certain discrepancy arose between our resources and our needs."

In its recommendations the Central Committee did little more than rewrite previous resolutions on the subject of economic efficiency. Decentralization was invoked again, and so were "material incentives" and "the active participation of workers in management." The economic plan for 1957 is being revised to meet the emergency, and the CC expressed the hope that "conditions [will be] created for drawing up a balanced plan for 1958."

The crucial problem of coal supplies has been increased by Poland's decision to cut its exports of bituminous coal to the Soviet bloc. *Mlada Fronta* (Prague) observed on January 29 that even with a planned increase in bituminous coal output of 1.5 million tons and in brown coal output of 3 million tons in 1957, "we shall still be short 700,000 tons of brown coal and 400,000 tons of bituminous coal . . ." Matters are made worse by the lagging of coal production in the Ostrava-Karvina basin, chief source of Czechoslovakia's bituminous coal.

Draft Plan For 1957

The economic situation was delineated still further in radio commentaries on the economic plan for 1957 (Radio Prague, March 2). A draft of the plan and of the budget for 1957 were approved by the government on March 1 for submission to the National Assembly later in the month. The plan allot 25 billion koruny for State investment, 13 percent more than invested last year. Special attention will be given to coal, chemicals, building materials and agriculture. While the target for coal production is 75 million tons, and for electricity production over 18 billion kilowatt hours, these are not expected to be enough. The fuel shortage will be made up in part by the substitution of brown coal for bituminous on a wider scale than before, and by greater consumption of natural gas. The engineering industry is to play an even greater role in foreign trade than previously: while engineering output is scheduled to increase 11 percent in 1957, exports of machinery and equipment are to rise by a third. No explicit reasons for



First photograph taken of the Czechoslovak motor convoy immediately after their arrival in Lhasa at the end of their long journey. Here they are drawn up in line in front of the new Lhasa Hotel, behind which is the Potala Palace, winter residence of the Dalai Lama.

Picture and caption from *Czechoslovakia Today* (Prague), January 1957.

the latter change were given, but it is apparently part of the Soviet bloc's adjustment to the consequences of last fall's events in Hungary and Poland.

Continued Ferment

Despite the regime's efforts to suppress all signs of discontent, manifestations of this discontent continue to appear sporadically in print, particularly in Slovakia. The February 2 issue of *Kulturny Zivot* (Bratislava) thus contained an article by Stefan Drug highly critical of the official press. Drug charged among other things that the press is chronically lacking in lively, legible reading matter:

"One very rarely comes across a good commentary, the type of print used and the subtitle 'feuilleton' generally being the only indications that the author was endeavoring to write such a commentary. . . . It looks as if journalists—personalities with judgment and opinions of their own—have already died out in our midst, as if there are no more voices speaking for the people. . . . It seems that there exists only a formless mass of employees of newspapers who are unable to rise above and beyond the bulletins of the [official] Czechoslovak Press Bureau."

Drug said that authors, to some extent, are trying to save

the honor and reputation of journalists. He praised the critic Rudolf Fabry, but added that if he is an exception, it is because he meets little competition. He praised Fabry's admonition to writers to criticize more freely, but showed little confidence in the effectiveness of his own advice:

"There is no competent person who will be bothered by this criticism. . . . How many complaints have there already been about the railways, distribution of goods, and so forth, and yet nothing is changed! Is there really no controlling or executive organ that would care for order or improvement? Can it be hoped that the new edition of Fabry's articles, in which he criticizes all kinds of violations of Socialism, will not be a voice in the desert?"

A reply to Drug's charges was voiced in the February 17 issue of *Kulturny Zivot*. They were termed incorrect, superficial and unjust but were partially admitted. Without dealing specifically with Drug's charges, the reply asserted:

"Drug's impression of a formless mass [of journalists] is a very superficial impression. There are various reasons for the shortcomings in our press. . . . It is one thing to criticize shortcomings and analyze the reasons for them and quite another to pass nihilistic judgement which refutes everything that is positive. . . ."

Trials

Publicity given to a series of recent arrests and trials of persons accused of espionage and anti-State activities served notice to the people of Czechoslovakia that the regime is in no mood to tolerate any opposition to its rule. That the trials were meant to be a clear lesson to the people at this time was underscored by the fact that one of the men charged with espionage, Jan Potonec, was said (Radio Prague March 2) to have been arrested when he crossed the Czechoslovak border from West Germany as long ago as the end of 1955, allegedly armed with a pistol and equipped with much money and false papers. Potonec was said to have confessed his contacts with French intelligence.

A trial in Prague involved eight persons accused of having distributed letters exhorting people to demonstrate against the government in Prague's Wenceslas Square last October. Radio Prague said on March 1 that the defendants were also charged with having written to the United Nations requesting that the question of suppression of personal freedoms in Czechoslovakia be put on its agenda. Although neither "crime" produced results, two of the defendants, charged also with espionage activity for a foreign power, received seven and six year sentences respectively; the others were sentenced to from one to two-and-a-half years.

In a third trial, Jan Manas and nine accomplices were charged with establishing and working within an illegal organization called "The Slovak Golden Eagle." Radio Bratislava stated on February 26 that the aim of the organization was to educate youth in the spirit of the Slovak People's Party (a pre-war Catholic Party), separatism and Fascism. Manas, who is 26 years old, was said to have founded the organization on instructions from persons serving life sentences in Czechoslovak prisons with whom he established contact while he was imprisoned for another "crime."

Population Figures

Reports in *Rude Pravo* and *Prace* (Prague) of February 12 contained the latest population statistics, including a figure of 13,292,000 persons for the entire country at the end of 1956. The reports disclosed that the number of agricultural workers had increased by 95,000 last year to a total of 1,893,000. Since 1954, when the number of persons working in agriculture was said to have been 1,715,000, authorities have sought to end the flow of workers from that sector to the industrial centers in order to protect and raise the level of agricultural production.

This has not precluded a rise in the number of industrial workers. Although the total number of these workers was not given, the number of workers in heavy industry was said to have risen last year by 2.5 percent and now exceeds 1,500,000.

The mortality rate was given as 9.5 per 1,000, with an infant mortality decrease from 34.1 per 1,000 in 1955 to 31.5 per 1,000 last year. In the past 5 years, longevity reportedly rose by 5½ years, making life expectancy 66 years for men and 71 years for women.



"We have reduced production costs 50%"

Rohac (Bratislava), January 31, 1957

Relations with Hungary

A recent exchange of visits by Czechoslovak and Hungarian economic and cultural missions seems to indicate that Czechoslovakia has now been allotted a major part in the task of bolstering the Kadar regime. A Hungarian delegation, headed by the then Minister of Trade Sandor Ronai, visited Prague February 8. The visit was returned on February 25, when a Czechoslovak delegation, headed by Otokar Simunek, Chairman of the State Planning Office, went to Budapest. No definite agreement emerged from these meetings, but it was stated that the "mutual exchange of goods can be further increased" (Radio Prague, February 25).

An agreement for cultural cooperation was signed in Prague on February 12 by representatives of the two governments, and a group of Czechoslovak writers visited Hungary during the last two weeks of February.

National Assembly Session

The National Assembly convened on March 6, and considered recently negotiated international agreements, a new law on national committees, the draft plan for 1957 and other matters.

The new national committees law appears to be an attempt to give the impression of greater popular participation in local government. According to *Rude Pravo* (Prague), March 7, Justice Minister Vaclav Skoda said the law provides for an increase in the number of national committee members in communities with less than 2,000 inhabitants. He said that almost 180,000 members were elected to the committees in the last election.

Albania

Hoxha Attacks Liberalization

Albanian First Party Secretary Enver Hoxha presented the recent Plenum of his Party's Central Committee (Radio Tirana, February 17) with a defense of Stalin and an attack on "revisionists" in tones which even Soviet leaders have been reluctant to employ in recent months. Although his diatribe was directed most vociferously against the Yugoslavs, he also attacked the Polish press and elements of Western Communist Parties.

Attacking attitudes of the post-Stalin liberalization, he quoted Stalin's thesis that "an internationalist is one who is ready to defend the Soviet Union since that is the center of the world revolutionary movement." He condemned those who disseminate "demagogical slogans about being relieved from dependence on the Soviet Union, about restoring a country's sovereignty, and the like." He charged that those who attack Stalin do so to discredit the Soviet Union, the "Socialist" system and the "international workers' movement."

F A B U L A



"Yes . . . your criticism of me is just . . . I'll see what I can do about it . . ." (The drooling fox is reading a cook book, opened at a recipe called "Duck in its own feathers.")

Informatia Bucurestiului (Bucharest), January 17, 1957

As for Yugoslavia, the Albanian Party leader asserted that much of the vicious attack levelled against that country by the Communist bloc after the 1948 Yugoslav-Soviet break—attacks since apologized for—was justified. He charged that the Yugoslav theoretical system is "a mixture of rotten theories, starting with Proudhon and Bakunin and ending with Trotsky, Bukharin and the workers' opposition." Hoxha repeated charges that the Yugoslavs were trying to transform the Kosovo area (containing a largely Albanian population) into a base for action against Albania.

Appraisal of Hungary

Discussing the Hungarian uprising, he said that "treacherous" elements inside and outside the Hungarian Communist Party had cooperated with "counterrevolutionary opportunists"; these elements, he said, were led by Imre Nagy. He decried as unfounded the Yugoslav interpretation of the beginning of the Revolt as a popular uprising of the working masses provoked by a bureaucratic political system and by errors of the Rakosi-Gero group. He said such interpretations were aimed at obscuring the situation, at attacking the People's Democracies and at sowing confusion in the ranks of the Communist Parties.

In dealing with Polish developments, Hoxha described the Poznan riots (June 1956) as a "provocation," adding that there were aspects of the Polish press "which we do not consider just." In analyzing recent Polish events, Hoxha said:

" . . . after the XX CPSU Congress, reactionary forces and right-wing, opportunistic elements, gathered under demagogic slogans of the struggle against the cult of Stalin and bureaucracy, for sovereignty and independence from the Soviet Union, and so on, started an offensive to undermine the Soviet Union, the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party and the Polish people's regime.

"They published articles in the press urging a hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union and disseminated bourgeois and reactionary ideologies. Later the situation worsened and hostile activities were carried out against the People's regime, such as demonstrations and anti-Soviet acts . . .

"They began a great campaign aimed at revising the political system of the People's Democracy. The PZPR and the government may have made mistakes. This is well known by our Polish comrades; but these mistakes should have been settled by normal means, by the Party and the government of Poland . . .

"The Polish working class, guided by the PZPR headed by Comrade Gomulka, was able to bar the way to reactionary elements. Our people have welcomed the victories which the Polish working class gained in the recent elections for the Polish Sejm, elections prepared in a difficult situation and on which internal reaction and imperialism had placed much hope."

Referring to other countries, Hoxha warned that "enemy attacks" have succeeded in influencing some Communists. He spoke of unstable elements in the Italian Party while praising the French Party, which has resisted the trend toward de-Stalinization.

"Where is the People's Conscience?"

Following are excerpts from an article in Literaturn Front (Sofia), December 20, 1956, by that journal's correspondent in Budapest. They reveal the disquiet caused by the Hungarian Revolt even in Communist intellectuals who accept the official thesis of "counter-revolution" and their attempts to rationalize away the realities of the Revolt.

"It has been a month since my arrival in Hungary. I saw much, and much was told to me by eyewitnesses. I visited plants in Budapest and stood in front of destroyed and burned homes. I was speechless before mothers with torn hearts and tasted the gunpowder smell of the rifles and cannon of the counterrevolution....

"I come to the question which has disturbed me ever since I arrived on Hungarian soil and which still disturbs me. How did it happen that there existed in the ranks of so many people for so many days such tragic confusion, ambiguity, distortion of conception . . . such a demoralizing anarchy in evaluation which makes the mind defenseless against even barely disguised hostile influence? The story is one of the perplexity of people, honest and sound before that, linked by blood with the deeds of Socialism, detesting Fascism and capitalistic reaction. Many comrades, trying to explain the circumstances of the complex environment created in the first days after October 23, stress that the events were so surprising and unexpected for everyone that they created confusion in even the soundest mind. . . .

"In my ears ring, as hammered-in nails, the words: 'We, the writers, are the conscience of the people'; words which have been repeated so often and so proudly, especially in the last few months. . . .

"I heard them at the Congress of Czechoslovak writers, and in my opinion the writer should indeed be the moral support of his people, helping them to find the truth and win their happiness. . . . But what has happened?

"Until October 23, the Hungarian writers, journalists and intellectuals found ways of publicly expressing their opinions, of coming before the people and stating their truly humane, democratic and Socialist ideas. They spoke openly about everything: about the mistakes of the former Party leadership; about the difficult economic situation; about offences and injury caused them by former leaders of the cultural front; and about the lack of sufficient creative freedom and civil democracy. In a word, the writers spoke about everything they considered necessary to be condemned in the past, to be corrected today and to be encouraged in the future. . . .

"The infection of 'criticizing' spread to the cafes, meetings, universities, and even flooded the streets. It should be emphasized that the majority of the criticizing Communists had the purest aim—to improve social-political life, to cleanse it of violations and mistakes done in the past in order to speed up the building of the Socialist society. However, not all critical voices directed their thoughts correctly, nor analyzed the past clearly or completely, nor mobilized any real faith in the future. To criticize everything and everyone became a fashion which alone determined whether a man was politically reliable. This 'river of criticism' soon was flooded by various dirty streams of reac-

tionary slander and overflowed the basin of elementary prudence, turning into a raging force carrying everything along with it, stones and—fertile soil.

"Let us not forget that at the center of everything was the good intention to scourge and uproot the mistakes and crimes really existing in the past period. But as events proved, some of the methods of this fight were fatally impolitic. Purely domestic Party questions were disclosed for 'discussion' in public squares, and Party documents and decisions were anathematized if only one word in them was not liked by someone. Anarchic demands for freedom and democracy were pronounced with a naive and humane pathos in which there was no trace of the class nature of these conceptions. . . .

"In the confusion, trying not to miss any detail of past errors, nor to leave unexposed some noted Party or State functionary, the intellectuals and writers forgot the most important thing that gives meaning to their efforts—whom does their 'critical' purpose serve? . . .

"Mistrust of the Party was introduced under various formulas. The writer Laszlo Hars [believed still to be living in Hungary], for example, insisted that the Party and country rehabilitate everyone they had offended, and that this should be done before the entire Hungarian people. . . . As for Tibor Dery [believed now to be jailed in Budapest] . . . he hoped that 'perhaps after the Twentieth Congress [of the CPSU] the writer will have freedom planned for him in Socialism.' Here it is difficult to understand what supernatural freedom the writer Dery was dreaming about, when he could freely write such sarcastic lines on Socialism. . . .

"Perhaps the most brilliant example of suggesting disbelief and doubt in the power of the Party . . . [as well as] developing the feeling of helplessness, was given by the writer Gyula Hay [now under arrest in Hungary]. . . . It is true that he fought against one of the most awful evils of Socialist society—bureaucracy and its carriers. Mistakes were admitted, but what Party in the world, what other political system could so daringly and courageously look into the face of these mistakes and correct them? . . .

"I spoke with many journalists, but they all said: 'Like the writers, we had only good intentions.' Yes, but responsibility and clear consciousness of whom one serves is necessary. . . . The events of October 23, and those which followed, found many writers, journalists and intellectuals demoralized, disarmed and confused in the contradictions between their 'justice' of freedom and democracy and the real justice of the class fight. That is why the writers kept silent, disorganized by their own 'good' will and by the good will of the thousands who demonstrated in the name of Socialism and of the national-democratic order, not seeing behind these people's backs the dark forces of reaction, of counterrevolution and of restoration. . . ."

1957 Budget

Radio Tirana announced on February 18 that the Albanian regime has issued its 1957 budget. The planned total income for the year is 15 billion *lek*, .8 billion more than in 1956. Planned total expenditure is 14.9 billion *lek*, over a billion more than last year.

78 percent of the total income is to be derived from the "Socialist sector." 9,063,000,000 *lek* (61 percent) of expenditures will be allocated "to the development of the economy," 2,157,445,000 *lek* going to industry and mining and 1,153,000,000 allocated to agriculture. 2,850,000,000 *lek* (19 percent) will be spent for "social and cultural development." One billion *lek* (6.6 percent) will be allocated for defense.

On February 23, a 1957 trade agreement similar to those negotiated periodically in the past was signed by Albania and the Soviet Union in Moscow. Radio Tirana on that date stated that the agreement "anticipates an important increase in goods exchanged in comparison with previous years."

Romania

1956 Plan Results

According to a report on the 1956 plan published in *Scintea* on February 17, the overall production plan was fulfilled by 105 percent. Production allegedly rose 11 percent over that of 1955, with a 14 percent increase in capital goods and a seven percent increase in consumer goods.

Unsatisfactory work by certain ministries, "especially the Ministries of Mines, Timber, Building Materials and Food Production," resulted, however, in nonfulfillment of the cost reduction plan.

The report stated that the "Socialist" sector of agriculture covered 30.8 percent of the country's arable land in 1956, as compared to 25.6 percent the previous year. The number of peasant families in kolkhozes increased by 26 percent over December 1955, when the percentage of collectivized peasants was 5.5 percent of the total number in Romania.

1.6 billion *lei* were invested in agricultural projects in 1956. This represents 11.2 percent of total investments. Although total investments were said to have risen 15 percent over the 1955 figure, only 94 percent of the investment plan was fulfilled.

Specific percentage increases or decreases in production



Romanian Party leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej casting his ballot in the recent Romanian "election."

Photo from *Svet v Obrazec* (Prague), February 23, 1957

in 1956 were as follows (percentage increases in 1955 in parentheses): steel, 2 (22); pig iron, 2 (33); coal, 6 (10); oil, 3 (8); power, 13 (16); rolled steel, 5 (13); chemical fertilizer, 18 (70); ball bearings, 24 (48); cement, 10 (28); sodium carbonate, -1 (33); internal combustion engines, 24 (49); tractor plows, -6 (7); meat, 17 (35); sugar, 16 (39); milk, 12 (17); woolen cloth, -1 (4); metallurgical coke, 78 (32).

Texts and Documents

"CRISIS OF INTERNATIONALISM"

This article, by Jerzy Wiatr, appeared in the November-December, 1956, issue of the Polish Communist theoretical journal, Nowe Drogi. It frankly analyzes past and present differences among Communist Parties and Communist-controlled countries.

DURING THE LAST few months—in the period following the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and especially during the events of October and November—a distinct difference of views on a number of key political problems has developed in the international workers' movement. These differences have begun to assume the character of a vehement controversy resembling a struggle rather than a debate.

This is a new feature or, at least, it is one that has been absent for many years. Little wonder, therefore, that it has given rise to consternation and, in some countries, to questions about the fate of proletarian internationalism. This is not an insignificant problem. The workers' movement has cherished international traditions since its very beginning. The slogan "Workers of the World, Unite!" is near and dear to Communists of all countries. So the purification from Stalinist deviations of the idea of internationalism and the return to its real meaning is all the more important. A prerequisite of this is an awareness of the differences existing in the workers' movement as to the interpretation of international Communist solidarity. Only by openly clarifying existing differences and by overcoming them during the course of Party debate and in the development of Party life can the basis for real unity be produced.

I

As everyone knows, the internationalist character of the workers' movement received a serious setback in the Stalinist period despite the emphasis put on it by official propaganda. It was the very concept of internationalism which was stripped of its basic meaning.

The key factor in the adulteration of this concept was the approach to the

problem of relations with the USSR. This is without a doubt the basic problem of the international workers' movement. Stalin was not mistaken in attaching great importance to it, but he was far from Lenin's principles in his attempts to solve it.

In fact, the attitude towards Soviet Russia became one of the major criteria of the Parties of the Third International immediately after the October [1917] Revolution. This was a correct reflection of the background against which the first land of Socialism had arisen when the Revolution was in its war period. Defense of the USSR was in those days an unqualified imperative for every Communist and was not liable to conflict with the demands of proletarian internationalism, especially since the Revolution was still free from perversions.

There was discipline in the Communist International during this period; the will of the majority was binding for the minority. The International, which was a sort of general staff of the world revolution that was supposed to come soon, was adapted to the needs of the period of revolutionary unrest. Today, it is difficult to evaluate correctly those principles of the organization of the International. Today, they would be obsolete and harmful. But at the time, they were probably a result of circumstances. It should be remembered that this discipline was based on *real democracy in the life of the International*. The CPSU based its central role in the International on moral authority and not on the authority of power.

After Stalin's ascent to power and the advance of the Stalinization of life in the USSR—important changes for the international workers' movement—democracy in the International was increasingly replaced, and finally replaced entirely, by the method of giving orders. Of course,

this process took a long time to develop. Let us add that during the period of the violation of Socialist legality Communists had a profound confidence in the CPSU. This fact was favorable to the creation of precisely such a situation [of Stalinization] in the international Communist movement. In such circumstances, the discipline of the Parties . . . devoid of democratic basis, deprived them of freedom of discussion. Such discipline became useful as a means for taking advantage of support given by the movement to the first proletarian State—and thus, making Stalinism stronger. The autocracy, shrinking from nothing, was stained by the blood of International activists, whose fate was much the same as that of Leninist cadres of the CPSU.

The practice of Stalinism found a "theoretical" defense in a well-known thesis of Stalin that the attitude towards the USSR was the touchstone of a Communist's honesty. In the abstract, this thesis is correct. It is true that a Communist cannot remain passive to the USSR. He must defend it against imperialist intervention and counterrevolution; in a word, against all external dangers and also against the danger of internal deviation. However, this is not what mattered to Stalin. For years, an axiom was repeated stating that a Communist ought to accept—or rather, glorify—every move of the government of the USSR. This unfortunate teaching made many Communists keep their mouths shut in 1937 and resulted in the crisis in 1939, dangerous to many Parties. It also became a source of many mistakes after the war. The restoration of a proper meaning to the slogan of solidarity with the USSR is now perhaps the life-or-death question of the Communist movement.

II

After World War II, the international workers' movement entered a new phase. It was characterized by the following circumstances:

There took place in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe the shaping of a system of People's Democracies. This occurred thanks to the advent of social revolution which took place simultaneously with the national struggle for freedom aided by alliance with the USSR.

Victory of the Chinese Revolution and the formation of the Chinese People's Republic—the second Socialist power.

The growth of anti-Fascist forces in Western Europe and the emergence of coalition governments of the left (France, Italy) with Communist participation.

Dissolution in 1943 of the Third International, which created a necessity and a possibility for new ways to realize international solidarity of the proletariat.

Under these circumstances, it was a matter of first importance to find new forms for relations between Communist Parties suitable for any given situation.

Under Stalinist dictatorship, leaders of the CPSU did not attempt a revision of methods previously used, and what is more, there was an infamous effort to extend obsolete norms of political life to relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. Putting a brake on the initiative of Communist Parties was ostensibly done for the good of internationalism and for the development of Communism. The Yugoslav affair was, in one sense, a natural consequence of using Stalinist concepts of internationalism in relations between the Socialist States. The Republic of Yugoslavia, under Communist leadership, emerged victorious from this grave trial. But the anti-Yugoslav provocations seriously poisoned the atmosphere in the international workers' movement. It put further off the possibility of a revision of Stalinist ideas concerning the relations between the workers' Parties. In the sphere of relations between the USSR and People's Democracies this provocation and the trials of Kostov, Rajk, Slansky and others became new instruments for the infringement of basic principles of legality and also of the principles of sovereignty and equality of all States. In Poland, this infringement was coupled with a campaign against alleged right-wing and nationalist deviations.

"Essential Differences"

This state of affairs continued until July 1955; that is, until the Plenum of the CC of the CPSU. The XX Congress in particular marks the beginning of the struggle for revision of the workers' movement, and, among other things, for the return to the Leninist concept of internationalism. In Poland, this process was preceded by a struggle aimed at a restoration of Socialist legality, manifested by pressure on the then Party leadership from the Party masses and from Party activists. This movement was partially stifled by that leadership, but it gradually made itself heard.

The XX Congress of the CPSU revealed many important facts about life in the USSR. What is more, these facts became a subject for Party discussion. The conscience of every decent Communist must have been stricken when he

saw that by backing everything that happened under Stalin, he also affirmed the ever-deepening abyss between politics and humanism, as well as the perversion of Socialism. Under these circumstances, independence of evaluation came to life again. The problem of the real meaning of internationalism became an important element in the discussion and struggle inside Communist Parties.

This matter was all the more important because after the XX Congress essential differences of opinion on many problems linked with the dilemmas of the XX Congress were visible in the workers' movements. Which problems?

Firstly, there were differences of opinion concerning the character of the perversions of the Stalinist period. In the CPSU, the view prevailed that those perversions were the evil consequences of the cult of the individual. Comrade Togliatti, leader of the Italian Communists, posed the question of their social origins and consequences. Criticism of those perversions was also heard in our Party. Differences of opinion concerned evaluation of the role of Stalin and the appraisal of his deeds. In the official terminology of many Parties, "Stalin's mistakes" were referred to, but the American *Daily Worker* and a considerable section of the Polish press demanded the use of the word "crime." More than mere words were at stake.

"The Yugoslav Affair"

Secondly, there were differences of opinion concerning methods to redress the harm done. The leadership of the CPSU and of all Parties in the People's Democracies chose to fight the personality cult and democratize the existing system. Similarly, many Parties in the capitalist countries concentrated on the struggle against the cult of the individual and on democratizing life inside the Party. In the French Communist Party, the view prevailed that there was no need to fight the personality cult because that Party was not threatened by any such danger. At the same time, many Communists were of the opinion that the official concept of Socialism should generally be revised to remove its anti-Socialist ills. This trend became victorious in Poland during the days of the Eighth Plenum and it opened the way for a new, independent type of Socialism, democratic and non-bureaucratic.

Thirdly, differences of views centered around the Yugoslav affair. Recantation of charges levelled against the Yugoslav comrades presented the workers' move-

ment with the necessity for making up its mind about the achievements and experiences of that country which is building Socialism independently and against Stalinism. Should we benefit from its experiences? This question was posed to the Parties of the People's Democracies. Many of us had been aware of the need for carefully following developments in Yugoslavia and for taking advantage of them as well as of other experiences in building Socialism. But there were others who, a few weeks before the Eighth Plenum, were issuing "warnings" against "stooping" to the Yugoslav position. Today one can observe a connection between the defense of the Stalinist positions in the workers' movement and such "warnings" against utilizing Yugoslavia's experiences. It is clear, however, that a critical and creative application of the experience of all Parties is indispensable to the Socialist cause.

Fourthly, there is the problem of relations within the workers' movement. Comrade Togliatti proclaimed the need for the polycentricity of the movement; in other words, for developing the independence of the Communist Parties. This thesis was linked to the idea of creative competition between governing Parties, to the working out of the most suitable methods for developing Socialism. In many Parties, including the Communist Party of the USA, claims for greater political independence began to make themselves heard. On the part of the Stalinist forces, opposition to this tendency expressed itself in a denial of the problem as such. In Poland, for a long time after the XX Congress, the label "anti-Soviet" was stuck on views which were destined soon to become an element of the general Party line, views demanding equal status in relations between the USSR and Poland and between the CPSU and the Polish United Workers' [Communist] Party.

As a matter of fact, differences of views on this score manifested themselves in all Parties, naturally with different degrees of emphasis.

III

In late October and early November, two events deepened the differences existing in the workers' movement and became the truly crucial test for proletarian internationalism. These were the affairs of Poland and Hungary.

For a long time, the struggle of the left wing of the Polish United Workers' [Communist] Party against Stalinist conservatism had attracted attention in the

international workers' movement, where it met with reaction ranging from that in *Humanité* [Paris] which can be described as, to say the least, cold, to the favorable view of the New York *Daily Worker* and of the Italian *Unita*. With the Eighth Plenum of our Central Committee, the left-wing tendency became the Party line.

At the very beginning of this turning point, there were different opinions in fraternal Parties; the Communist Party of China supporting our struggle for the regeneration of Socialism, democracy and full sovereignty, and the Yugoslav League of Communists repeatedly expressing its full backing for our struggle. Many comrades from other Communist Parties also reacted sympathetically to the changes occurring in Poland from the outset.

As is known, in the days of the Plenum, there was some misunderstanding of our attitude among the leadership of the CPSU. The *Pravda* [Moscow, October 21, 1956] article titled "Anti-Socialist Statements in the Polish Press" was an especially unfortunate expression of disapproval of the transformation in progress. However, after the visit of the CPSU delegation to Warsaw and as a result of subsequent talks and contacts, the attitude of our Party obtained approval as did the principles proclaimed at the Eighth Plenum. This was expressed in the Soviet declaration of October 30, 1956 and later in the development of relations between our Parties and countries. The Moscow visit [of Gomulka in mid-November], its course and results, is important proof that the principles of the Eighth Plenum were recognized as the basis for a new relationship between our Parties and countries. This affirms our belief that in the future too we shall resolve any difficulties which may materialize.

"Accusations Against Us"

The attitude towards the changes in Poland assumed considerable importance in the workers' movements of various countries. It is clear that these changes met with the staunch approval of the non-Communist left, which makes it even more relevant for Communist Parties to adopt a proper attitude towards that group. Many Parties, for instance the Chinese Communist Party, the League of Yugoslav Communists and the American Communist Party, took a friendly attitude towards changes taking place in our country. Other Parties—and these are more numerous—after hesitating, were able to understand our changes. A manifestation of this attitude was—after pub-

lication of the [aforementioned] *Pravda* article—the publication of the reply of *Trybuna Ludu* ["In the Name of True Friendship," October 21, 1956] in the organs of those Parties. In some Communist Parties, however, accusations made against us still are upheld. The Communist Party of France plays first fiddle in this tune. This is all the more painful for us since we keenly and sincerely feel solidarity with the heroic French Party. We fail to understand the attitude of its leadership towards the resolutions of our Eighth Plenum. Their charges against our Party—which are, incidentally, typical of those levelled elsewhere against the Polish Party—boil down to the following:

Firstly, that we wrongly assess the Poznan events [the June 1956 riots], failing to see in them primarily the intrigues of a hostile agency. Secondly, that we are restoring bourgeois democracy, from which the road lies open to a restoration of capitalism. And, thirdly, that our changes may weaken the unity of the Socialist camp.

Arguments on these theses have taken place often. I don't want to return to them, but I want to stress another point—the danger to internationalism. This danger does not lie in differences of opinion which always characterize a lively political movement. But when differences of opinion turn into attempts to cut off the French Communist Party from access to news about Poland, then there is a real threat to the unity of the working classes. I do not conceal my anxiety that the basically Stalinist leadership of some Parties is prepared to sacrifice the Leninist, democratic norms of Party life to prevent their members from coming into contact with that stream which has among its sources the achievements of our Party. In this lies a serious danger for the workers' movement as a whole.

IV

Events in Hungary had a much more dramatic character. From the beginning, there were considerable differences in evaluation by various Communist Parties. In the initial stage, our Party dwelt on the democratic character of the rising, as there could be no doubt for us that the Hungarian people had rightly risen in struggle against the anti-national tyranny of Rakosi, Gero and their clique. Nor was there any major disagreement among us [Poles] on the assessment of the call to the Soviet forces on October 23 as a wrong step, showing that the Stalinist group in the Hungarian Workers'

[Communist] Party was a reactionary one, alien to the people. We considered the situation that arose through the appeal for foreign troops highly dangerous. Our Party emphasized the right of every nation freely to decide its own fate.

In that stage our attitude was similar in principle to that of the Chinese, Yugoslav, Italian, Belgian and American Communists whose Parties rejected the allegation of a counterrevolutionary plot. Yet these allegations were given prominence by the press organs of many Parties, in particular *Rude Pravo* [Prague], *Neues Deutschland* [East Berlin] and *Humanité* [Paris]. I think that the problem of evaluating the Hungarian movement symbolizes the problem of the international workers' movement.

In the second stage of the events in Hungary, as is well known, counterrevolutionary tendencies, acts of white terror, chauvinistic leanings and attempts to restore capitalism asserted themselves. There is no disagreement among Communists about condemnation of these features. Their origin may be understood, but they may not be approved. The Leninist Parties were awake to this danger and expressed their concern. In doing this, our Party once again stressed its unshaken loyalty to the principle of sovereignty for all States and of non-interference in their internal affairs.

After the events of November 4, our Party, as the other Communist Parties, recognized the *fait accompli*. Guided by the supreme considerations of our *raison d'état* and making full allowance for the existing state of affairs, our Party took the view that the further development of Socialism in Hungary ought to be left to the Hungarian working class and that any interference by the United Nations was only liable further to inflame the situation.

However, in that stage also there existed and continues to exist distinct differences of views between the Communist Parties. We see no reason for triumph in the happenings of November 4 [the final Soviet intervention]. Believing as we do in the Hungarian working class, believing that it will resist the forces of a capitalist counterrevolution and also will not allow Stalinism to come to life again, we still consider tragic the circumstances which gave rise to the situation as it is.

Small wonder that the leadership of those Communist Parties which from the outset condemned the Hungarian events as counterrevolutionary eagerly seized on the events of November 4. The different reactions to these events is the fruit of a long-standing disagreement between the

forces of Stalinism and the trend towards a regeneration of Communism. It may be that the fate of the Communist movement as a standard bearer of the left hinges on the proper solution of that conflict, on the elimination of Stalinist influences, and on the restoration of true proletarian internationalism. Not only have the attacks of the Fascists on our Parties been stepped up of late, but a wrong attitude on the Hungarian problem in many countries isolates Communists from the non-Communist left and is the basis for a profound crisis in the Communist movement itself.

V

So we are in the midst of a great test of internationalism. Its old, Stalinist conception has proved to be not only unsuitable, but downright harmful, in that it has encroached on Communist solidarity and on the brotherhood of the workers' parties. It paved the way for conservatism. Revision of this conception is demanded by the entire political climate of recent times, and to postpone it means to render a signal service to those unwilling, or simply unable, to return to Leninism.

Any revision of the concept of internationalism must take two circumstances into consideration. Firstly, the fact that there is a sharp political struggle going on in the workers' movement against perversions tending to strip this movement of its Communist character should be considered a starting point for a real understanding of international solidarity. The struggle against Stalinism is, in fact, not only proceeding between people, but also within them. We are ourselves still ejecting the poison injected into us in the preceding period. What we need is patience and understanding and greater efforts to convince others of our point of view. That is how we fought the battle inside the Party. That is how we fight it now in the whole of the workers' movement.

At the same time, it is possible to see criteria for differences in the struggle against Stalinism. Not everybody who is still burdened by Stalinist morals or political perversions in this or that problem is lost to the Communist movement. But he who is actively engaged in erecting "curtains of misinformation" within the workers' movement, who, instead of reasoned arguments, resorts to epithets and unwarranted judgments, who betrays the Leninist, democratic approach in relations with comrades from fraternal Parties, such a person decidedly harms the

cause of the international unity of the Communist movement.

I do not want my opinions on the renaissance of Leninism to have an administrative monopoly in our Party or in the international workers' movement. Such a monopoly is a characteristic feature of Stalinism. Moreover, it is unnecessary for the development of sound and healthy ideas. On the contrary, it may harm them. That's why I do not think we will demand such a monopoly for our opinions. But we have a right to demand from our comrades, from internationalists, that they objectively present our views and struggles, that they argue against our opinions and not against opinions attributed to us, and that they conduct this controversy in an atmosphere which excludes the possibility of persecution of men agreeing with us. These are indispensable conditions for a Party discussion in the international workers' movement.

Despite the habits of the Stalinist period, internationalism cannot be interpreted today exclusively as the solidarity of the different Party apparatuses and leaderships. It must regain its proper meaning of militant solidarity of the working class, of the Communists of all countries. It is only on this foundation that brotherly cooperation of Parties can truly develop, not as a formal custom, but as a result of real "brotherhood of arms" among Communists and, in general, Socialists of all nations. Such a conception of internationalism, which is far from the official one, can and should become a basis for assuring real unity of ideas in the Communist movement and for safeguarding it against splits as well as against a strengthening of Stalinist positions. The struggle for a renaissance of the Communist movement and the struggle for its unity are the same, and supports itself through internationalism....

"Soviet Experiences"

The second circumstances to be considered in revising the conception of internationalism is the fact that a number of countries today are governed by Communists and that some are engaged in a creative quest for new ways to build Socialism on a basis of national sovereignty and equality. From this arises the need for the entire international Communist movement carefully to examine these quests. Nothing can be more harmful for the Communist Parties in the West than an uncritical *a priori* recognition of some State or economic form or cur-

rent moves of any Socialist country as the best or the only one. We are not talking here about so-called "national characteristics." Even more important is the problem of various possibilities in solving certain structural questions while differences of opinion exist concerning forms of organization in Socialist economy, transformation of agriculture, the system of one or several parties, etc. Every country today makes a contribution to the treasure house of the international workers' movement and its theoretical arsenal by its achievements and its defeats alike. That is why the one-sided study of Soviet experiences as the only pattern has to be overcome in the entire Communist movement. As long as this practice, veiled as it is by professions of interest in the achievements of other Socialist countries, is maintained, there will be a voluntary impoverishment of the theory of our movement and the likelihood of it committing past mistakes will remain.

"Sovereignty and Equality"

I should also like to state clearly that in my opinion it is impossible to reconcile internationalism with tolerance of and silence about the evil which is festering in other Parties. A Communist must combat that evil. He cannot be shorn of that right by slogans concerning so-called specifically national characteristics. For the norms of Party life, democracy and relationships with other Communist Parties are not a mere question of specifically national characteristics. That is why not only tolerance has to be appealed for but also principled mutual Party criticism which will give all Communist Parties a chance of ridding themselves of the degeneracy of the Stalinist system.

But the existence of Socialist countries has yet another consequence for the international workers' movement. History shows that between these countries there may arise differences and even conflicts. Maybe these are the result of Stalinist perversions. But since they exist, no matter what their cause, the attitude of the Communist movement towards their manifestations ought to be defined in an internationalist way. It would appear that such a definition can be based only on the recognition of each nation's absolute right to sovereignty and equality, on the treatment of each issue on its merits, from a viewpoint of international solidarity and not in terms of ascendancy of this or that country. Such an attitude might have spared the Communist movement

the necessity to side with the USSR in the conflict with Yugoslavia, where right and fairness were on the side of the latter. The conclusions drawn from this extremely painful period will be tremendously important for the future.

A crisis in internationalism? Many features, including those referred to above, would seem to indicate its existence, the existence of a breakdown of that conception of internationalism which has been instilled into two generations of Communists. Yet this is a salutary crisis. From the rejection of old axioms which

are at variance with the very foundations of the movement there ought to emerge the idea of genuine internationalism which will never again become a smoke-screen for servility, for pandering to nationalism, for a disavowal of the basis of Socialism. The struggle to restore to the idea of internationalism the old contents of Marx and Lenin and to enrich it with results of new conditions is today inseparable from the big issue of the renaissance of Communism.

Today, when the unity of the workers' movement is a matter of paramount im-

portance, we must be aware that restoration of unity among Communists and the creation of unity among the whole workers' movement is only possible if the Leninist conception of internationalism is fully restored and a full and creative discussion is possible in the entire workers' movement. From such a discussion alone, a frank and principled Party discussion, a genuine, rather than formal, unity can be born, a unity that is the hope of contemporary forces of social progress, a prerequisite for the victory of Socialism.

MOSCOW'S THEORETICAL JOURNAL DISAGREES

The following passage, disagreeing with the Wiatr article above, appeared in the Soviet magazine Kommunist, January 1957.

CERTAIN PEOPLE TEND to interpret the discussion which developed in international Communist ranks as a symptom of the 'crisis of internationalism.' For instance, Jerzy Wiatr expressed such a view in the Polish journal *Nowe Drogi*. Without touching on other parts of his article, much of which is impossible to agree with, let us note the fact that the author finds 'great divergencies in views on many key political problems' and that according to his view 'there are many facts which bear evidence to the crisis of internationalism.'

"These contentions do not conform to reality. There is no cause to speak of alleged 'divergencies in the views of Communist Parties on the question of class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the role of the Marxist-Leninist Party, proletarian internationalism, and so forth.' Truly, are there any divergencies in the views of the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, China, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, etc.?"

Erratum

In last month's article on chemicals, the location of Poland's recently discovered sulfur deposits was mistakenly given as Leczyce (p. 14). The deposits are at Tarnobrzeg in the province of Rzeszow.

Recent and Related

The Challenge of Soviet Education, by George S. Counts (*McGraw-Hill*: \$6.00). The author proposes in this study to demonstrate the extent to which the Soviet Party dominates education, and to analyze the goals which controlled education is expected to attain. It is pointed out that the Soviet education program "constitutes the most comprehensive and sustained effort in history to reach distant social goals by employing all the agencies and processes of twentieth-century society for molding the minds of . . . a vast population." The basic and overriding task of such educational manipulation is to create a new Soviet man whose attitudes toward labor, property, religion, individualism, social class and Party shall conform to the prescribed pattern. Professor Counts also examines Soviet advances in reducing illiteracy, in vocational and technical training, and in the education of the soldier, the intellectual, the artist and the Party member. Appendix and index.

Democracy and Dictatorship, by Zevedei Barbu (*Grove Press*: \$1.45). Holding that modern governmental systems constitute an entire pattern of life, this study attempts to spell out the basic social and psychological characteristics of democracy and dictatorship. Communism, Mr. Barbu states, stemmed from the same processes which under more favorable circumstances promoted West European democracy. In Russia's case, however, an impoverished backward people, conflicts inherent in its culture, and disruptive changes wrought by the industrial revolution made that country a likely breeding ground for totalitarianism. The author then examines features recurrent in all dictatorships, such as disregard for the individual, emphasis on class consciousness, glorification of the State and a pervasive atmosphere of suspicion.

National Communism and Soviet Strategy, by D. A. Tomasic (*Public Affairs*: \$4.50). This study is concerned with Titoism not only as an historic and political movement, but also in regard to its significance for Soviet strategy. Since Yugoslavia provides the classic example of "national Communism," greatest attention is focused on the origins and development of the movement there, although similar tendencies in other coun-

tries, i.e., Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, are also covered. The author contends that Titoism actually plays a part in the USSR's design for world control. He states that the Kremlin in the post-Stalin period visualizes a restructuring of States: the Soviet Union provides the axis around which revolves an inner ring of Satellite States, which, in turn, is surrounded by a belt of neutralized but Soviet-oriented countries. The author also believes that the Soviet Union approves of limited concessions to "national Communism" as a means of pacifying the frustrations of the Soviet-dominated peoples. However, Professor Tomasic points out that it may be just these concessions which will prove to be the disintegrating forces working against Soviet monopoly of power. Index.

God Is Late, by Christine Arnothy (*Dutton*: \$3.50). This novel by the author of *I Am Fifteen—And I Don't Want to Die* presents a telling picture of life in a country under Communist rule. It explains in personal terms the conditions which led the Hungarian people to revolt. Miss Arnothy has not sentimentalized her characters: they are vain, selfish, petty and weak. Yet they are to be pitied, for they are all overwhelmed by fear of the Communists. Janos Tasnady, for instance, a conductor and composer, is plagued by the fear that he will not receive a government subsidy because his cousin was involved with the Nazis. He therefore allows his wife Gaby to become the mistress of a Commissar from the Ministry of National Security. Gaby and her sister, in turn, are afraid to speak freely, each believing that the other has turned Communist. The fears and fate of this family are ultimately resolved by the impersonal, malevolent State.

The Fate of East Central Europe, Stephen Kertesz, ed. (*Notre Dame Univ.*: \$6.25). This is a timely compendium of essays on the countries, history and problems of East Central Europe, written by outstanding authorities in the field. In Part I of the study, the course of American policy toward the area in this century is surveyed. Part II, entitled "Creation of a Soviet Empire in Europe," treats the Communist seizure of power in each of the Satellite nations, while Part III examines Communist activity in

the peripheral nations of Finland, Austria and Yugoslavia. Economic trends, problems of East-West trade and the economic consequences of a divided world are covered in Part IV. The work concludes with a discussion of the problems which would arise should the Satellite nations be liberated. Among the contributing experts are Philip Moseley, Robert Byrnes, Oscar Halecki and Robert Wolff. Index.

A History of Soviet Russia, by Georg Von Rauch (*Praeger*: \$6.75). In a single volume the author has compiled a comprehensive survey of Soviet Russian history, 1917 to 1956. In addition to an exposition of the basic political and economic facts of the period, discussion of broader issues such as the foundations of revolutionary thought in Russia, inconsistencies between Marxist theory and Soviet practice, the conflict between nationalism and internationalism, and the status of privileged groups in totalitarian society, is included. Professor Von Rauch holds that Soviet Communism is a "social structure which owes its origin to a curious amalgam of rational Western Marxism and the secularized Messianic bent of Russian political thought." Maps, an extensive bibliography, a chronology of important dates and an index of names.

Marxism and French Labor, by Leon Dale (*Vantage Press*: \$4.50). More than in any other country outside the Soviet orbit, the French labor movement is Communist controlled. By tracing the history of the French labor movement from the 1789 Revolution to the present, this book reveals the methods and extent of Communist infiltration. The author attributes Communist strength to factors operating both within and beyond French borders: externally, support is lent to the Communists by Soviet funds, Soviet propaganda and the "proximity of the Red Army"; internally, recurrent Cabinet crises, class consciousness, housing shortages, periodic unemployment and an unfair tax system redound to the Communists' favor. The author also examines the influence of the Communist Party and the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) upon French politics, showing how Communist tactics have contributed to the instability of the Fourth Republic. Charts, bibliography and index.



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